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Abstract 
This thesis looks to examine the period before and after the financial crisis of 2008 in order 
to identify any potential shifts in ship financing. For our period of analysis, we defined the 
pre period from the start of 2005 until the end of august 2008, while the post period is 
defined as the period from September 2008 until the end of 2012. 
In our empirical analysis we have used inferential statistics to test our predictions. The data 
used have been gathered from two world-renowned shipping information providers, 
Clarksons and Marine Money. By pooling and later segmenting the provided data, we have 
created our own database, tailored for our research questions.    
Our analysis shows that there has indeed been a shift from the traditional financing source of 
bank loans towards corporate bonds. By the end of 2012, bond issuance stood for almost 
45% of ship financing, up 40% from the start of the sample. Such a shift also involved a 
change in location of funding, with Asia and Scandinavia providing significantly greater 
number of debt issuances in the aftermath of the financial crisis, while North America, 
Europe and the Middle East experienced a deterioration of their funding proportions. In 
addition, the use of public equity markets as means of financing has greatly declined, 
resulting in a greater reliance on debt in the post period. 
Given the increased importance of bonds, the authors have also examined this instrument in 
more detail. Our findings show that bondholders demand higher return and are less willing to 
engage in long-term commitments in the post period, as a result of the greater market 
uncertainty. Such an uncertainty has also caused banks to alter their lending practice, with a 
greater focus on risk mitigation.  
Our takeaway from our analysis is quite extreme, with a severe change in ship financing over 
the last eight years. Looking into the future, we do believe that the ship financing picture has 
changed permanently, but in a less radical way than what we have observed in our sample. 
We expect bonds to take a larger part in ship financing, nevertheless, we still expect bank 
loans to be the primary source of capital. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last eight years, ship financing has probably changed more than in the last couple of 
centuries. After years of continuance of boom and bust cycles in the start of the millennium, 
the shipping industry experienced one of the greatest booms of all times in the period of 
2003 through 2008. With increased demand for seaborne trade fuelled by the emerging 
Chinese economy, freight rates skyrocketed leading to a mass expansion of the world 
shipping fleet. Such expansion needed funding with shipowners primarily tapping bank 
loans and public equity markets. By 2008, the demand for seaborne trade had reached its 
culmination point, and when the financial crisis hit, world trade was negatively affected 
resulting in a substantial overcapacity of ships. This caused the freight market to collapse. As 
a result of the crash in the financial market, a series of bankruptcies rippled through the 
market causing counterparty credit concerns. With the trust gone, short term funding costs 
went through the roof, causing bank liquidity to dry up. This led shipowners to turn to the 
bond market for financing. By the end of 2009, market sentiment had again recovered, 
resulting in a new round of investments. The recovery was, however, short lived, as the 
European Sovereign Debt Crisis emerged by the start of 2011. This second downturn hit 
both banks and investors hard, causing funding to almost dry up, with now bonds 
representing an increasingly large share of ship financing. 
The purpose of this thesis is four folded. Our main research question is that we wish to 
examine whether there has indeed been a significant change in ship financing as a result of 
the recent financial crisis. Secondly, we wish to establish that this crisis has affected the 
instrumental variables of debt. Thirdly, given the significant change of funding, we further 
wish to determine whether there has been a change in location of funding. Lastly, we wish to 
use traditional capital structure theories to analyze to what extent these theories can explain 
the shift in funding, and whether such a change is permanent.     
This thesis is divided up into 13 chapters. We initially introduce general shipping theory, in 
order for the reader to build up the necessary understanding of the industry. The following 
chapter presents the most relevant capital structure theories, which have been included to 
give the reader a better premise for understanding shipowners’ choice of funding. The 
succeeding three chapters elaborate on the main types of funding available to shipowners. 
Next, three fundamental topics are included to establish key insights of the various asset 
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classes. Chapter 8 then describes the statistical theory behind the analysis, while chapter 9 
addresses the dataset used in our analysis. In chapter 10, all of our hypothesis are put 
forward and justified. We then go through the general macroeconomic development of the 
sample period, before finally presenting our results and analyzing them. 
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2. Shipping 
The following theory section for shipping is taken from Martin Stopford’s, Maritime 
Economics 3
rd
 edition (2009).  
The concept of shipping has existed for thousands of years. Ever since the first transportation 
of cargo that dates back more than 5000 years; seaborne trade has led to exploration and 
discoveries that have shaped the world of today. With global development, trade has 
increased which has led to greater demand for transportation. Today, more than 90% of 
world trade is transported by the shipping industry, making it a truly global industry.   
2.1 Segments 
The shipping industry can be divided into three segments: bulk shipping, specialized 
shipping and liner shipping.   
Bulk Shipping:  
The bulk shipping segment carries large homogeneous parcels, such as raw material cargo 
and can be split further into the following sub segments: 
- Liquid Bulk: Refers to the transportation of liquefied commodities including crude oil, oil 
products and liquid chemical. 
- The five major bulks: Referring to the transportation of homogenous commodities: iron 
ore, grain, coal, phosphates and bauxite. 
- Minor bulks: Refers to other commodities such as steel products, steel scrap, cement, etc.  
Liner Shipping 
The liner shipping or general cargo shipping, which it is also known as, carries parcels that 
are too small to justify a dedicated bulk shipping operation. The container shipping segment 
is part of this group. There are no fixed rules for what characterizes as general cargo, 
however, boxes, bales, machinery, 1000 ton steel products are typical examples of general 
cargo.  
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Specialized Shipping 
Specialized shipping is specially built ships that carry non-homogeneous cargo such as 
motorcars, forest products, refrigerated goods, chemical and liquefied gas. It can therefore be 
viewed as a combination of the bulk and liner segment, as it bears characteristics of both. 
2.2 The Four Shipping Markets 
Global sea transport is provided by four directly related markets; freight market, the market 
for buying and selling of second-hand ships, the newbuilding market, and the demolition 
market.  
2.2.1 The Freight Market 
The freight market is the market where sea transport is sold and bought. Today, there is one 
single international freight market, however, within this market there are separate markets 
for each different type of segment. Although these markets are in the short term independent 
of each other, there exist long-term spillover effects from one segment to the next. In the 
freight market, the shipowner can use both the spot market and charter contracts. In the spot 
market, the ship is exposed to sudden changes in freight rates due to change in demand, 
compared to long-term contract where freights are fixed. Although the rates are higher in the 
spot market, there is great risk involved in being exposed to this market, as the rates are 
volatile and thus shipowners can easily lose money either from a sudden drop in freight rates 
or the vessel lying idle. However, the long-term contracts are not completely safe either, as 
they bear credit risk on the chartering part.  
Within the freight market there are four different types of contracts: 
- Voyage Charter: Contract that arranges for the transportation of a specific cargo 
from one destination to another, for a fixed price per ton.   
- Contract of affreightment: Under this contract the shipowner agrees to transport a 
series of cargo parcels for a fixed price per ton. Here, the charterer leaves the details 
of each voyage to the shipowner. The shipowner, on his side, will look to utilize his 
fleet in the most efficient way, thus enabling him to switch cargo between vessels to 
ensure the most streamlined and profitable operation.  
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- Time Charter: A contract that provides operational control of the vessel transporting 
the cargo to the charterer. The shipowner retains the ownership and management of 
the vessel. A time charter can last for the time it takes to complete a voyage (trip 
charter) or over a period of several months (period charter). Under this contract the 
shipowner pays for the operational costs, while the charterer pays for the voyage 
costs.  
- Bare Boat Charter: Provides a company with full control of the ship without 
owning it, typically used in leasing deals. Here the investor buys a ship and hands 
over control to a charterer for a certain period of time, typically 10-20 years. The 
charterer is thus responsible for all operating and voyaging costs of the ship.  
Typically, a shipping firm keeps a part of its fleet in the sport market and a part tied up on 
the time charter market, in order of diversify its portfolio. Such a strategy enables it to take 
advantage of an upswing in the market, while at the same time secure a minimum revenue 
level from its fleet. 
In addition, there exists a freight derivatives market. Here shipowners and freight charterers 
can hedge their freight risk or even make bets on the future, by engaging in forward freight 
agreements. These financial contracts are settled on the basis of a future value of a freight 
market index.   
2.2.2 The Sale and Purchase Market 
In this market, second-hand ships are traded between shipowners. Since second-hand ship 
prices are dependent on freight rates, age, inflation and expectations of future earnings, the 
value of ships can be volatile. The volatility in price is thus important to shipowners, as the 
trading of ships is a major source of revenue.  
2.2.3 The Shipbuilding Market 
This is the market where new ships are ordered from the shipyards. Since the ship has to be 
built, this ads complexity to the contract process in the form of specifications, delivery date, 
payments and financing of the purchase. The ship prices are related to the prices in the 
second-hand market, market expectations, the capacity of the shipyard and the access of 
affordable financing. The investment in a new ship is of considerable risk, since it takes two 
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to three years for it to be delivered, thus with the volatile nature of the shipping industry, the 
market conditions may have changed upon delivery.  
2.2.4 The Demolition Market 
The demolition market (often referred to as the recycling market) is the market where old or 
obsolete ships are dismantled and sold for scrap. The procedures are similar to the once 
under the sale and purchase market, but the customers here are scrap yards, rather than 
shipowners. The major scraping markets are today located in eastern Asia. The scrap price 
has historically varied substantially over time. The price is determined by the supply of ships 
and the demand for scrap metal, which in Asia, is usually dependent on the demand in the 
local steel market.   
2.3 Cycles 
Economic cycles can be defined as the varying pattern of economic activity over a period of 
time. Market cycles in the shipping industry are a prominent part of the business. Martin 
Stopford uses the analogy of poker to describe the behaviour of shipowners in shipping 
cycles. Like poker, profiting from the cycles is a combination of skills, luck and psychology 
for the shipowners, which is a game that has been played for centuries.   
With cycles we can distinguish between three different types, in relation to how long they 
last. 
- A long-term cycle refers to a cycle lasting for several decades that is driven by 
advancement in technology, change in economic conditions and regional changes. 
Thus, it is important for shipowners to pay attention to whether the market is in the 
downturn or upturn of the cycle.  
- Short term cycles or business cycles typically last anywhere from 3 to 12 years. 
Within the short term cycles of shipping, there are four different stages which have 
the following characteristics: 
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Figure 1: Cycles in shipping 
 
Source: Stopford (2009) p 102 
o Trough: Characterized by surplus shipping capacity and freight rates falling 
to the level of operating costs for the least efficient ships. The low margins 
can lead banks to foreclose on firms, forcing shipping firms to sell modern 
ships at distress prices. The prices of old ships fall to scrap prices, leading to 
increased demolition activity, which again reduces the oversupply of ships. 
o  Recovery: While market sentiment is still uncertain, supply and demand start 
to move towards equilibrium, causing freight rates to move above the 
operating costs.  
o Peak/Plateau: Supply and demand tighten, while freight rates start to rise. 
The freight rates typically rise 2-3 times above the operating costs. The peak 
can last for weeks or years, which is dependent of how the balance between 
supply and demand develops. As the excitement increases an almost euphoric 
sentiment is created in the market. High earnings and increased asset values 
led to; banks being more lenient with credit, talks of a new era in shipping, 
public offerings of shipping firms in the stock market, as well as increased 
ordering of newbuildings.  In the second-hand market, ships are sold for more 
than their replacement price, while modern ships trade for more than their 
newbuilding prices.  
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o  Collapse: In this stage, the oversupply of vessels in the market exceeds the 
demand, drastically driving down the freight rates. This decline can further be 
reinforced by economic shocks like the financial crisis. As ship prices 
decline, shipowners are reluctant to sell ships due to the previous prices in the 
peak period.  
 
Looking at the phases of the business cycle, investors may be tempted to try to time 
the market cycles of shipping by counter cyclical ordering large volumes of ships. 
This, however, risks prolonging the downturn and halting a potential recovery that 
would have happened, had they not flooded the market with new tonnage.  
- Seasonal cycles refer to the fluctuations in a year. In shipping, one can observe these 
fluctuations in the dry bulk sector, where the transportation of grain is relatively low 
during July and August. Another example is in the tanker segment, where one can see 
increased activity as the Northern Hemisphere builds up its oil stocks for the winter. 
2.4 Shipping Taxation 
The shipping industry generally benefits from very low effective taxes due to favourable tax 
regulations in most countries. Since shipping activity is not geographically bound, like other 
industries, this means that shipowners are free to choose what country they want to register 
their fleet and operate from. There is, therefore, a strong incentive for the governments to 
offer favourable regulations in order to attract foreign companies and avoid flagging out of 
domestic operators. The taxation regimes within shipping can be split into three categories.  
2.4.1 Tonnage tax regimes  
The tax paid under the tonnage tax regime is not based on the actual profits generated by the 
firm, but rather on the actual tonnage of the vessel. The tax is calculated by multiplying the 
tonnage of the vessel by a fixed amount that represents the estimated profit per ton. Under 
the tonnage tax regime, there are two prominent models, the Dutch and the Greek model.  
Comparing the Dutch model with a regular taxation model, the main difference is how the 
profits from shipping activities are calculated and what vessels are included under the 
respective model. Other than this, the shipping firm and income from non-qualifying 
activities will be taxed under the regular taxation system. The Greek model is overall more 
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lenient, including all vessels and shipping activities under it. In addition, the two models also 
have special criteria for ownership, lock-up period, capital gains, flag requirement and the 
way the management is organized. However, the overall taxation will differ from country to 
country, even though they use the same model, as the governments will tailor it for their 
home country.  
Geographically the Dutch model is implemented in most EU countries as well as Japan, 
USA, South Africa and South Korea, while the Greek model is only used in Greece, Cyprus 
and Malta.  
2.4.2 Shipping incentives regimes (special benefits for shipping) 
This refers to the tax provision provided to shipping companies operating in the respective 
country. There are many different incentives, however, most incentives are typically 
associated with very low taxation. This is either done by reducing the tax rate, narrowing the 
tax base or through tax redemption. These kinds of tax regimes can be observed in countries 
like Liberia, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Panama, Russia and Singapore.  
2.4.3 Tax efficient regimes (low effective tax rate) 
Tax efficient regimes refer to countries that do not have any special tax regimes targeted 
towards the shipping industry, but rather treat all foreign operators on equal grounds. Despite 
the fact that there are no shipping specific tax regimes, it can still be attractive for shipping 
companies to register their vessels and operate out of countries like this. This may be due to 
exemption of taxation for foreign investment or accelerated amortization for the ships. Some 
of the countries practicing this are Antigua, Barbuda, Bermuda, Estonia and Saint Lucia 
(PWC, 2009).  
2.5 Today's Shipping market 
Looking at the market conditions in shipping today, one can see that the market is still 
suffering from the collapse of the world economy in 2008, following the booming years 
between 2003/4 and 2008. Today's market is characterized by dire market conditions, with 
freight rates being severally depressed due to an oversupply of tonnage relative to the 
demand for seaborne trade. At the moment, however, we do not have a demand side 
problem, with the growth of trade increasing with 3% in 2011 and 3.5% in 2012. On the 
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other hand, we do have a supply-side problem. This oversupply has been created by the rapid 
fleet expansion and ordering during the booming years, which was followed into the recent 
years of economic recession. As the freight rates of the recent boom reached astronomical 
levels, only comparable with those of the First World War, many of the operators built up 
substantial capital. This capital has now being put to use to build up cheap countercyclical 
investments. This is illustrated by a growth of 37% of the world fleet from 2008-2012. 
Even though there has been a gradual reduction of new orderings from its peak of 2009 and a 
gradual increase in demolitions, the supply of ships still far outgrow the demand, having a 
growth of trade of about 3.5%, paired with a 10% increase in the world fleet last year. It is 
expected that by 2014, there will be a fleet surplus of about 20% leading to severe excess 
capacity. Such structural unbalance leads to low projected growth in the future, and with 
another possible round of countercyclical ordering around the corner, the trough can be 
further prolonged.  
Going further in detail, the tanker sector is currently struggling with the structural problems 
mentioned, and the sector is losing growth due to the combined effect of high oil prices, and 
the emerging completive sources of oil; like shale oil and deep water oil from the Persian 
Gulf and Brazil. Bulk trade is doing a bit better, with Asia being its main driver. This 
demand is, however, not only created by China, but Asia as a whole, where China accounts 
for half of the demand. Liner trade experienced its first negative shock in 40 years in 2009, 
with a 6% decrease in seaborne trade. It has, however, partially recovered, but indications 
are now that the market is likely to be more volatile in the future (Stopford Presentation, 
2013).  
Looking into the future, according to Wilbur Ross, emerging markets such as China, Brazil 
and India are likely to carry the shipping market in the following years (qtd. LaRocco, 2013). 
This view is further reinforced by the recovery in world trade being led by these developing 
countries, having been much of the driving force behind the recent economic recovery.  
The resurgence of oil and production in the US, due to technological advances in attaining 
the reserves in the shale rock, is also an event that could cause large changes in both 
seaborne trade and oil production. It is predicted that the US will become a net exporter of 
oil by 2030, but this development is dependent upon the oil prices remaining at fairly high 
level. It is expected that a drop of the oil price under $70-95 per barrel would make it 
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unprofitable to extract these resources (Bartis et.al., 2005), and with it being just seven years 
since everybody predicted oil prices to sustain at $20-25 per barrel until 2030, the future is 
clearly not set. It is, however, likely that the success factor of this extraction will be an 
important variable in the in the world trade for years to come. The initial effect of the shale 
oil can already be seen, by among other things, Saudi-Arabia decreasing its export to the US, 
and shifting their exports to a larger degree towards China (IEA, 2012).  
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3. Capital Structure 
In this section, we wish to present the various capital structure theories, in order to better 
analyze the capital structure decisions that have taken place in the shipping industry during 
our sample period. 
The term “capital structure” refers to how the firm is financed through equity, debt or hybrid 
securities (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011). 
3.1 Miller and Modigliani. 
In 1958, Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani (MM) published their article “Theory of 
investment”, stating that under perfect capital markets the total value of a firm is 
independent of the capital structure. Despite initial criticism, this contribution by MM has 
become the cornerstone of modern financial theory.  
Their assumptions for perfect capital markets where: 
- “Investors and firms can trade the same set of securities at competitive market prices 
equal to the present value of their future cash flows. 
- There are no taxes, transaction costs, or issuance costs associated with security 
trading. 
- A firm’s financing decisions do not change the cash flows generated by its 
investments, nor do they reveal new information about them” (Berk, DeMarzo 2nd 
edition 2011, page 455). 
MM put forward two propositions: 
Proposition 1: “In a perfect capital market, the total value of a firm is equal to the market 
value of the total cash flows generated by its assets and is not affected by its choice of 
capital structure”  (Berk, DeMarzo 2nd edition 2011, page 455) 
MM supported their reasoning behind Proposition 1 with the arguments from the Law of 
One Price and Homemade Leverage. 
The Law of One Price states that under the assumption of perfect capital markets, all the 
cash flows generated by the firm will be equal to the cash flow paid out to all. This is 
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consistent with the Law of one Price, meaning that the value of the firm assets must be equal 
to its securities. This in turn means that as long the firms’ choice of securities does not 
change the cash flow of the firm; the value of the firm is independent on the source of 
financing. If the law of one price was violated one would have an arbitrage opportunity. 
Homemade Leverage 
The homemade leverage argument states that if investors are unhappy with the capital 
structure the firm has chosen, they can simply add/subtract leverage to/from their portfolio 
by borrowing/lending out themselves. This is known as homemade leverage, and as long as 
the investor can borrow or lend at the same rate as the firm, the added/subtracted leverage 
will be a perfect substitute for the use of leverage by the firm.  
Proposition 2: “The cost of capital of levered equity increases with the firm’s market value 
debt-equity ratio” (Berk, DeMarzo 2nd edition 2011, page 461). Given an all equity financed 
firm, as the firm starts to lever up with cheap debt, the risk of the equityholder increases 
proportionally. When the debt level reaches a sufficiently high enough level, the risk of 
bankruptcy surfaces. Additional leverage above this level results in an increase in risk for 
both equity- and debtholder. As a result of the increased risk, the equity- and debtholders 
will demand a higher risk premium and therefore a higher expected return. The levered 
return of equity formula and Figure 2 shows this relationship: 
 
Where: 
 is the expected return on levered equity 
 is the expected return on unlevered equity 
 is the expected return on debt 
 is the debt to equity ratio 
The theory of M&M provides further useful intuition on the cost of capital for new 
investments. Using the pre-tax Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), assuming 
perfect capital markets, one can see that the increased cost of equity is offset by the 
increased weight put on debt, thereby resulting in unchanged cost of capital. Consequently, 
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the way the firm finances its new investments does not change the value of the firm, as the 
NPV of the cash flows are discounted with the same WACC regardless. This causes the 
value of the firm to remain unchanged.  
Figure 2: Cost of Capital 
 
Source: (Berk DeMarzo p 462, 2011) 
=   
 
Where:  
  is the weighted average cost of capital 
 is the equity to enterprise value 
 is the cost of equity 
 is the debt to enterprise value 
  is the cost of debt 
 is the cost of unlevered capital 
is the cost of capital for the firms' assets 
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3.2 Trade-off theory: 
The trade-off theory rationalizes the use of a certain debt ratio. This is because the incurred 
interest cost from the debt is tax-deductible on the firms’ taxable income. As a result, the tax 
paid on the firm’s income is offset by the interest tax-shield created by the interest expense, 
leading to a lower taxable income for the firm. However, with increased debt levels the 
probability of financial distress increases. In this respect, the trade-off theory says that a firm 
will increase its leverage to the point where the marginal net present value of the interest tax 
shield is just offset by the increased net present value of possible costs of financial distress 
(Myers, 2001).  
The following formula displays the relationship: 
 
Where:  
VL is the value of the levered firm 
VU is the value of the unlevered firm 
PV (Interest Tax Shield) is the present value of the tax shield created by the interest from 
debt 
PV(Financial Distress Costs) is the present value financial distress  
Source: (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011) 
The net present value of financial distress can be separated into direct and indirect cost. The 
direct costs refer to the legal and administrative fees relating to lawyers, accountants, and 
other professionals involved in the bankruptcy filing (Weiss, 1989).  
While the indirect costs consist of a variety of unobservable expenses and opportunity costs 
that are difficult to measure. These include loss of: customers, suppliers, employees, 
receivables and fire sale of assets (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011).  
A study by Andrade and Kaplan (1998) shows that financial distress costs of highly leverage 
firms that became distressed, make up between 10-20% of the firm value.  
Figure 3 shows the intuition behind the trade-off theory: 
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Figure 3: Trade-off Theory 
 
Source: (Johnsen, 2011) 
The theory suggests that all firms should lever up as long as the costs of financial distress are 
less than the benefit from the added tax shield. Empirically this does not hold, since studies 
show that the most profitable firms tend to borrow the least amount. This is counterintuitive 
to the trade-off theory, since these firms would have large taxable incomes that would 
benefit from the deductible interest tax-shield, created by the added debt (Myers, 2001).   
3.3 Pecking order theory: 
The pecking order theory created by Myers and Majluf (1984) describes the firms’ hierarchal 
view on use of financing options. In their analysis, they looked at a firm with asset-in-place 
that required further financing to realize a growth opportunity.  
The theory can be summarized: 
1. The firm prefers internal funds to external funds. 
2. The target dividend ratio is changed accordingly with the firms' investment opportunity, as 
the firm tries to keep abrupt changes in dividends to a minimum. 
3. As a result of dividend policy being "sticky" and the profitability and the investment 
opportunities varying over time, the capital expenditure sometimes exceeds the internally 
generated funds and vice versa. Should the funds exceed the capital expenditure; the firm 
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will pay down debt or invest in marketable securities. However, should we have the opposite 
case where the capital expenditure exceeds the internal funds, the firm would use its cash 
balance or sell its marketable securities to achieve balance. 
4.  In the case where external finance is needed, the firm will issue the safest security first; 
from safe to riskier debt, and finally equity as a last resort (Brealey, Myers, Allen, 2011) 
(Myers, 2001). 
The reason firms prefer to issue debt over equity is that there exists information asymmetry 
between the management and the market. Assuming that the management is acting in the 
best interest of the existing shareholders, the management will not issue equity when they 
view the company as undervalued, as this would be a gift to new shareholders. If they view 
the firm as overvalued they will be more willing to issue equity, as this would benefit the 
existing shareholders. However, since the market is aware of the information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders, it will quickly react to the issuance of equity, and 
drive down the stock price, eliminating this overvaluation. Therefore, assuming both 
management and shareholders are rational, the management will issue debt over equity 
whenever this is possible. 
The pecking order theory does not give a target debt ratio, since the two types of equities, 
internal and external, are situated on top and bottom of the pecking order list. The observed 
debt ratio of a firm is therefore a sign of the cumulative requirements for external finance.  
Compared with the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory actually explains why the most 
profitable firms have the lowest debt ratio. This is because they have excess internal funds, 
and therefore do not require external funds to finance new projects. Less profitable firms on 
the other hand, need to borrow to make up for the funding gap between their capital 
expenditure and the internal funds available (Brealey, et al., 2011).  
3.4 Market Timing Theory 
The market timing theory refers to a hypothesis put forward by Baker (2002), which states 
that firms will choose the cheapest source of financing at point of time when the financing is 
needed. They will hence pay attention to the market conditions and attempt to time the 
market, choosing the best alternatives of financing from equity and different debt 
instruments. 
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The theory is based on behavioural finance and differs from the traditional pecking order 
theory and trade-off theory, as this theory does not try to choose between equity and debt. 
The theory rather tries to find which source of capital that benefits the firm the most. The 
goal is not to find the optimal capital structure, but rather to take advantage of the market 
conditions by regulating the firms' capital structure.   
The theory further separates itself from the pecking order and trade of theory by not trying to 
explain why mispricing occurs or why the firm has a better ability to price the firm than the 
market. The theory rather assumes that mispricing does exist, implying that that the market is 
not perfect and that the management knows better.  
The empirical evidence for this theory is, however, mixed, like many other hypotheses in 
behavioural finance. Baker and Wurgler (2002) claimed in their paper that an index of 
financing from market trough and upswings illustrated this hypothesis, while other papers, 
such as Alti’s paper (2006), have found that this effect falls away after two years. It has 
furthermore been difficult to prove that certain firms are able to consequently beat the 
market, hence questioning the reliability of the theory. 
3.5 Relating financial theory to shipping 
According to Grammenos and Papapostolou (2012), the shipping industry has in the three 
past decades gone through a significant shift in the use of financing options. During the 80s 
and 90s, the Pecking Order theory fit the behaviour of shipping firms. Shipping firms 
mainly used debt, as the retained earnings was generally too small to finance a large ship 
investment. Stopford (2009) supports such statement by describing ship financing as 
dominated by bank loans, with bonds as the second choice of capital as long as the firms had 
the creditworthiness to issue debt.  
However, according to Grammenos and Papapostolou (2012), the development during the 
last decade suggests a shift from the Pecking Order theory to the Market Timing Theory. 
This has been especially evident in the US shipping market during the period 2003-10, 
where there has been a shift from the traditional debt financing towards the more 
untraditional equity financing.  
The main reasons for the shift towards the equity market were: 
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-  The banking crisis of the 1980’s that led to large losses in the financial sector. 
- The depletion of the equity base of shipping firms in the mid-80s. 
- The large scale-vessel replacement programs with increased capital requirements as 
well as high vessel prices in the 1999 and 2000. 
- A new generation of ship-owners and management that has a different perspective 
and academic background (Merikask, Gounopoulos, Nounis, 2009)(Grammenos, 
Papapostolou, 2012). 
In addition to the increased use of the equity market, there was also an increase in the 
popularity of the high-yield bond market. This development suggests that shipping firms 
raise their external capital based on their perception of the cost of equity and debt, and in that 
respect what is the best for the particular firm in the current state of the economy.  
Given the cyclical and volatile nature of the shipping industries, we do, however, believe the 
financing choices and preferences of the industry operators are likely to diverge from the 
norm. We, therefore, believe that we will see divergences from the general financial theory, 
which consequently may explain why financial theories only hold for a certain period of time 
for the shipping industry.  
3.6 Ship financing general overview.  
The shipping industry is one of the most capital intense industries in the world. Therefore is 
the choice of financing imperative for the success of new investments. Because of the truly 
mobile nature of the shipping industry, shipping firms face a less rigorous corporate and 
legal structure compared to other industries that are as capital intense. The volatility of the 
earnings and the value of the assets contribute to make it an exciting industry for shipowners, 
while more challenging for lenders, who seek stability and transparency.  
During normal market conditions, where the shipping industry generates respectable profits, 
shipping firms will generally have little problem to secure financing for their new 
investments. In fact, some would even say that the industry has been plagued by an 
abundance of capital, thereby resulting in an oversupply of ships (Stopford, 2009). Bank 
loans have been the prominent source of capital for the industry. However, in times when the 
financial sector experiences deteriorating credit markets, they will cut back on loans, thereby 
limiting the supply of credit to the shipping firms (Stopford, 2009).  
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When the "cheap" bank loan source dries up, shipowners have to look for alternative 
financing sources. The second prominent source of capital is the public equity and debt 
markets. As we will later discuss, there has been an upswing in the use of equity during the 
last decade. In addition, the lack of bank funding led to the resurrection of the high-yield 
bond market from the mass defaults seen in the late 90's (Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012). 
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4. Equity financing. 
In a capital intense and volatile industry such as the shipping industry, with vessel values 
tying up the majority of capital, there is a real threat of financial distress. Therefore, the way 
the firm finances its vessels is a key component of the business.  
For the shipping industry, the capital markets acts as a link between investors and 
shipowners, providing capital to fund new investments and growth. With changing market 
conditions, shipping companies have explored new ways to finance their investments.  
Equity financing can be separated into externally and internally raised equity. Internal equity 
refers to the use of the owner’s private equity, retained earnings from operations and the 
profit from selling ships (asset play) to fund investments. External equity refers to public or 
private equity offerings in the capital markets (Stopford, 2009) (Merikas et al., 2009) 
(Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012). 
4.1 Initial Public Offerings 
Initial Public Offerings (IPO) refers to the process of a firm listing itself on the stock 
exchange, in order to raise new capital in the form of a share issue. Firms that go public, 
work with an underwriter, which is an investment bank that manages and structures the 
deal. For the underwriter, there are three levels of commitment:  
-Firm commitment, where the underwriter guarantees the issue by purchasing the whole 
issue and then re-offers it to the public. The firm is then guaranteed that it will get the 
money, even though the issue should fail on the underwriters’ part.  
-Best efforts agreement. Here, the underwriter will sell the issue in the market; however, the 
firm has no guarantee from the underwriter that the issue will raise the intended amount of 
capital.  
-Book-building method, where the underwriter collects bids from investors and sets the issue 
price based on demand. This is the most common method used for shipping IPOs.  
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 The deal can either be structured as a primary or secondary offering. A Primary offering 
refers to new shares being issued to raise capital, while a secondary offering refers to the 
process where the current shareholders sell their shares to the public (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011). 
4.1.1 Advantages of going public: 
The major advantage of using equity financing in the form of an IPO, is the mitigation of the 
financial risk and obligation associated with issuing debt. Using debt, the company is 
obligated to make interest and principal payments to its creditors. On the other hand, the firm 
has no obligation to pay shareholder dividends. The reduction of financial risk is especially 
important in the volatile shipping industry, as a falling market may threaten the very 
existence of the firm.  
In addition, there are a number of other advantages and disadvantages associated with going 
public: 
- The newly raised equity will make the company more tolerant to the use of additional 
debt, as the gearing level of the firm has decreased (Grammenos, Papapostolou, 
2012). 
-  The added liquidity from the listing might decrease the illiquidity premium 
associated with privately held firms and therefore lead to an increase in the market 
value of the firm (Damodaran, n.d.). This does not necessarily apply to shipping 
firms, as the main assets of the firm are ships. Vessels are generally a liquid asset and 
therefore the illiquidity premium will likely be lower compared to other firms with 
more specialized "hard to sell" assets.  
- For family-controlled firms that go public, Brancel and Mittoo (2008) find that these 
families feel that IPOs give them added bargaining power with creditors without 
handing over control. 
- The success of the IPO will improve the reputation of the firm, increasing market 
coverage and transfer the monitoring costs from creditors to the stock exchange 
authorities (Brancel, Mittoo 2008). 
- Finally, the stock exchange listing leads to stricter control over the company, thereby 
reducing the probability of the management acting fraudulent (Grammenos, 
Papapostolou, 2012). 
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4.1.2 Disadvantages of going public: 
 
- For the existing shareholders, the IPO might cause them to lose their controlling 
stake in the company.  
- By diluting the current shareholders, they will in the future receive a smaller portion 
of the firms' profit, as they now hold a smaller proportion of the firms' stock. 
- Public companies have to regularly inform the market in accordance with the 
regulations of the stock exchange where the company is listed. This makes the 
management’s job more time-consuming and less flexible.  
- The company’s performance on the stock exchange is not only related to its own 
performance, but also the overall condition of the stock exchange.  
- There is a considerable one-time cost that the underwriters charge when going public 
(Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012). 
- A majority of the listings are related to firms in the bulk segment, thus the IPO price 
will be set close to the market-adjusted net asset value of the firm. This pricing is 
only reasonable when net asset value reflects the full earnings and cash flows of the 
company. According to Merikas et al. (2009), this is generally not the case in 
shipping, as the second-hand prices of vessels do not always reflect the future cash 
flows of the ship. They find that the prices in the second-hand market do, however, 
generally reflect a high multiple of operating cash flow. This pricing will hence 
create problems when the shipping market is in a downturn and the earnings for the 
certain bulk segments are negative. 
-  Finally, there is the observed IPO puzzle. It states that IPOs are systematically 
underpriced, and that an IPO offering typically increases just after the offering given 
its underpricing. In general the increase last between a day and a year, before 
underperforming the following three to five years (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011). Merikas et 
al. (2009) also find support for this underpricing, when it comes to shipping IPOs.  
 
Despite these disadvantages, Bancel and Mitto (2009) findings suggest that CFOs perceive 
the advantages to greatly outweigh the disadvantages associated with going public. Another 
study by Brau and Fawcett (2006) interviewing 348 CFOs showed that IPOs were viewed as 
a funding vehicle for the company’s growth. They were, however, also concerned with the 
large fees associated with listings on the stock exchange, but most of all the loss of 
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confidentiality and control. It should, nevertheless, be noted that the advantages of going 
public are highly market value dependent, and that it is generally only when the industry 
experiences a boom, causing the market values to be high or at least higher than the 
underlying value of the firm, that management typically takes the firm public. In shipping, 
we have, however, recently seen that these characteristics do not always hold, with several 
solid shipping firms deciding to fund through IPOs, even when the freight market is down. 
4.2 Follow-On Offerings (FO) 
After going public, a firm will generally seek to grow and explore additional investment 
opportunities leading to the need for more capital. A follow-on or seasoned equity offering 
(SEO) is where an already public firm offers new shares for sale to the public. Within FOs 
there are two possibilities, cash offer or rights offer. In a cash offer, the firm offers new 
shares to anyone, thereby having a dilutive effect on the existing shareholders. In a rights 
offer, on the other hand, the firm only offers shares to the existing shareholders, thereby 
protecting them from dilution.  
The market reaction to a FOs is generally negative. As with IPOs, the management is only 
willing to sell at a price that is correct or overvalues the company. This leads to the market 
believing that the company is overpriced, thereby resulting in a price drop. In addition, FOs 
have the same tendency as IPOs to underperform after issuance. Researchers have been 
trying to explain this phenomenon, explaining that it might be the conditions leading up to 
the choice of FO and not the FO itself (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011).  
4.3 Public equity and its role in ship financing up until 2005 
The use of more untraditional financing sources such as the public capital markets, for 
shipowners, started gaining popularity in the United States during the 1980s, and showed a 
substantial increase in the 21
st
 century. Before to this, the knowledge of the shipping 
industry had been limited and deemed a niche sector.   
During the 1980s, the shipping industry experienced a depression. Despite being plagued 
with depressed freight rates, many shipowners had obtained deep pockets during the earlier 
peak and were now looking to exploit the low shipyard prices. This led to a steep increase in 
the ordering of newbuildings. Expecting a market recovery in the mid-80s, their strategy was 
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flawed as many shipowners made the same strategic decision, thereby leading to vast 
oversupply when the newbuildings entered the market. Shipowners who had used large 
amounts of debt, from willing banks with large deposits of petrodollars, now faced severe 
financial problems (Stopford, 2009). This part of the crisis will be discussed in more detail 
under “Syndicate Problems”. The crisis wiped out the equity base of most shipping firms, 
and the banks who suffered large losses were more reluctant to make new loans for the 
second half of the 1980s. This contraction in the debt market, led shipping firms to start 
experimenting with funding through the US equity market. Furthermore, the increasing 
newbuilding prices during the late 80s/early 90s and the need for a large scale-vessel 
replacement of the fleet, also led to a further increase in demand for funding. In addition to 
the difficult financing conditions that the firms faced, a new generation of shipowners, with a 
different academic background and a more liberal view on ownership, emerged, leading to 
an increasing use of the equity market. By the start of the 21
st
 century, shipping IPOs really 
picked it up. Once shipping IPOs caught the attention of large institutional investors and the 
shipowners realized that this was a way they could effortlessly raise addition capital, the use 
surged (Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012).  
4.4 Private Placement 
Private placement is the process where a company, that is either public or private, offers 
securities to individuals or a small group of accredited investors. Securities offered, can 
either be of equity or debt, and private placement will hence also be described under our debt 
section. In such offerings, the investor can for example be in the form of banks, mutual funds 
or private equity firms. In the US, this does not qualify as a public sale of securities; 
therefore it does not have to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) or fulfill the usual reporting requirements. Contrary to an IPO, private placement is a 
cost effective and less time consuming procedure for a firm to raise capital (Private 
Placement of Securities, n.d.). 
4.4.1 Private Equity 
Private equity refers to a firm that has raised equity capital in order to invest in privately held 
companies. Private equity is usually organized in the form of funds, which pools money 
from a range of investors and invest collectively into a company.  The strategy of the private 
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equity funds differs according to the nature of their investment and their means of realizing 
the profits from the transaction. The profits can either come from operational income or from 
exit strategies such as IPOs, mergers and acquisitions, selling or leveraging of the assets 
(Snow, n.d.)(Imhof, n.d.). 
4.4.2 Private Equity and its Role in Ship Financing 
What we today refer to as private equity did not emerge as a source of capital before after the 
Second World War, when firms started to raise capital from sources other than wealthy 
families. Before World War II, venture capital investments were primarily the domain of 
wealthy individuals and families. Even as recent as 1970, private equity investments were 
mostly restricted to venture capital inputs into small firms in fast growing sectors by high net 
worth families. Even though venture capital has progressed since then, they comprised of 
less than 1/5 of all private equity deals done in 2007. The real boom in private equity 
happened in the 1980s and introduced a new type of private equity, namely leverage buy-
outs (LBOs), which today represent the main type of private equity deals. This type of 
financing refers to the takeover of relatively large companies, financed to a large extent by 
debt (Chandrasekhar, 2007). This type of financing really became popular in the 1980s, and 
just between 1979 and 1989, 2000 LBOs were completed for a value of more than $250 
billion (Opler, Titman 1993). By 1992-93, the bubble burst and many of the large buyouts 
ended up in bankruptcy. After this, private equity again experienced two periods of 
considerable growth, with small periods of reduced activity. The industry grew from 1995 
until 2000, before being hit by the Dotcom bubble. Hereafter, it again re-established itself 
and continued to grow steeply from 2003 to 2007, which is also known as the Golden Age of 
Private Equity (Chandrasekhar 2007).   
Private equity has traditionally not been a conventional source of financing within shipping, 
as their term return objective has historically made shipowners reluctant to use this type of 
funding. Shipowners have previously found that their incentives rarely are similar to those of 
the private equity firms. However, given the financial condition that several shipping firms 
found themselves in, following the financial crisis, shipowners had to seek alternative ways 
of financing, with much of the bank loans issuance gone, due to the financial difficulties of 
the banking sector. Private equity funds saw this as an opportunity to capitalize on the tight 
credit market and the subsequent historical low vessel values, expecting to see a significant 
return, once the shipping market rebounded. Given the lack of other opportunities and the 
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promise of access to great funds, several shipping firms/owners accepted the offers from 
various private equity firms. In the years of 2010 and 2011 there was a surge of private 
equity firms entering the shipping industry.   
The most common approach made by private equity funds, when entering into the shipping 
industry, is by joint ventures. This is typically done together with another investor who is 
either a shipowner or a manager. Since the shipping industry is very different from other 
industries, the private equity firm will have to rely on the expertise of its partner. This is due 
to the many laws that affect shipping, which can severally differ from jurisdictions. In 
addition, there is the conflict of interest between the shipowner/ management and the private 
equity fund, since private equity funds may have a different view on the objective and the 
strategic path to it, compared to the shipowner/manager (Imhof, n.d.). 
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5. Mezzaine Financing 
Mezzanine finance is a collective term for hybrid forms of finance. All financing that fall 
between the two main types of financing, senior debt and pure equity financing, are defined 
as such. There are various types of mezzanine finance, each having its own unique 
characteristics (European Commission, n.d). 
The most common form of mezzanine finance is subordinated loans. This type of financing 
refers to junior unsecured loans, implying a lower ranking in case of bankruptcy compared to 
senior debt. This type of financing is typically used to finance the expansion of existing 
companies, and as a result of the inferior claim on assets, it usually requires a higher interest 
rate compared to regular debt. 
Even though this type of financing is clearly debt, it possesses equity like characteristics, 
since most mezzanine lenders typically receive warrants, which may be exercised to 
transform the debt into equity in the borrowing company. Warrants can be defined as a 
derivate security offered by the firm itself, which allows the warrant holder to purchase stock 
in the firm at a specified price for a determined time period (Gaughan, 2007). 
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6. Debt 
In capital-intensive industries like shipping, equity financing may often fall short of the 
desired capital level needed to make the correct investments, and finance the best strategic 
actions. An alternative to equity financing is to turn to the debt market. Debt may be issued 
from many sources, however, we will in this paper, mainly focus on corporate debt as this is 
of most relevance to our topic. One can in general divide corporate debt into private and 
public debt. Within both these segments, debt is often classified according to whether they 
are secured or unsecured, have a senior or junior ranking, and whether it is syndicated or 
bilateral debt. In addition, there are also other types of corporate debt that display one or 
more of the characteristics noted above.  
All corporate debt is categorized as either secured or unsecured. Related to whether the debt 
has specific asset pledge to its lenders in case of liquidation. Secured debtholders are, as we 
will discuss later in chapter 7, the first in line to get their claims covered in case of 
liquidation. Within these two classifications, one also separates between senior and junior 
debtholders. In the state of liquidation, the senior debtholder will supersede the junior 
debtholder’s claim. A junior secured debtholder’s claims will, however, supersede a senior 
unsecured debtholder one’s. The level the loan is secured hence supersedes the ranking of 
the debtholder as long as the claim can be fulfilled with the sale of the secured asset (John, 
Lynch, Puri, 2003).  
6.1 Private Debt 
Having defined the different subcategories of debt, we now return to the bigger picture, and 
separate between private and public debt. One can separate private debt from public debt, by 
defining private debt as not being publically traded. The private debt market can be divided 
up into bank loans and private placements (Berk DeMarzo, 2011).  
Bank Loans 
The main type of private debt is bank loans. Within bank loans you have term loans, which 
are what one normally thinks about when talking about bank loans, and revolver loans, 
which are revolving lines of credit. Revolver loans are offered to some of the bank’s large 
customers and refer to an open credit commitment for a specific period of time, up to a 
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certain predetermined credit limit. Returning to term loans, these can be divided up 
according to their maturity, short and long-term loans. Term loans have historically been the 
most important source of capital in shipping, as it offers quick and flexible access to capital, 
without reducing owner’s control of the company.  
Syndicate Loan 
A bank loan can either be given out by an individual bank or syndicated by a group of banks. 
By syndicating the loan, the bank is able to spread the risk by sharing the loan among a 
number of banks. This is the usual practice for large loans, and it has often been used for 
ship financing, as an investment here often requires a significant amount and would hence 
represent a significant risk for only one bank. For the shipping banks, this practice further 
allows banks that do not possess relevant shipping knowledge needed to appraise shipping 
loans, to participate in the loans by following the risk assessment of the lead bank. Allowing 
the smaller non-shipping banks into the market have, however, historically had mixed 
results. It may be an easy way for such participants to make money in good economic times; 
however, they seem to often lack the required understanding of the market to do the 
“correct” decision when the market turns. Such behaviour was illustrated in the 1980s 
depression.  
After a recovery of the world economy at the end of the 1970s, the world economy again, 
moved into a new period of low economic activity, which lasted until 1987. With tanker 
firms experiencing steady decline of seaborne oil trade until 1983, and the bulk sector 
loosing pace in 1981, after having experienced years of booming. Freight rates hit new lows 
between 1983 and 84, with some brokers describing it as the worst ever (Stopford, 2009). 
Many banks had overextended themselves during the boom, and when the market turned, 
many of the smaller banks without shipping knowledge did not have the industry knowledge 
needed to make rational judgements. Many were desperate to reduce their exposure, and 
either wanted to pull back their loans or waited for the lead banks to take action. This led 
many, both creditors and debtors, to take losses that they were not necessarily required to. 
One can hence say that the syndicate loans led many participants into the market where they 
perhaps should not have been, and in that way increased the effect of a potential crisis 
(Falck, 2013)(Gade Greve, 2013). 
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Term Loans  
As we in this paper wish to look further into the capital sources available to the shipping 
industry, we will focus on the 3 types of term loans available to the shipowners. These are: 
mortgage-backed loans, corporate loans and loans provided through the governmental 
shipyard credit schemes. 
Mortgage backed loans 
Mortgage-backed loans refer to loans that take security in a ship of the lenders fleet. This is 
hence referred to as a secured loan. This type of financing opens up the opportunity for 
shipping companies to take loans that they might not otherwise be creditworthy for. The 
percentage of vessel market value at which the bank is willing to consider as security 
depends upon the age of the ship and the state of the shipping market; however, loans rarely 
exceed 50%. With extra security in form of time charter, mortgages on other ships or 
personal guarantees from the shipowners, the bank might be convinced to increase the loan 
ratio towards the full ship value (Stopford, 2009). 
Corporate loans 
Corporate loans refer to loans given to large, well-established companies with collateral on 
the corporate balance. These types of loans are given at the convenience of the big 
companies. Such firms typically have large fleets and any change in their fleet, would 
involve a time-consuming loan transaction with the mortgage-backed loans option. It is 
hence much more convenient for them to loan on the company as a whole, receiving credit 
based on the company’s name. The advantage of this arrangement is that it gives the 
company a flexible source of capital. The disadvantage, on the other hand, is that the banks 
loans are not secured in specific assets, as they have assumed that these companies are “too 
big to fail” (Stopford, 2009). This type of mentality has recently proven to be ill advised. A 
perfect example of this going wrong is the previous shipping giant OSG recently filing for 
bankruptcy (Church, Milford, Kary, 2012).  
6.2 Shipyard credit scheme 
Shipyard credit scheme refers to a financial aid scheme offered by various governments to 
shipowners, in order to add incentives to put in orders at respective domestic shipyards. 
These schemes are also know as government credit schemes, and were introduced in the 
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1930s. What we today consider shipbuilding credit schemes were, however, first introduced 
in the 1960s when Japanese shipyards were the first to launch an export credit scheme. 
Fierce credit competition from the European shipyards followed before OECD regulated the 
inter-country competition of shipbuilding credit offerings. This regulation is still in force, 
and was last updated in 2002. Most European shipyards today offer credit schemes based on 
OECD terms (Stopford, 2009). 
There are three ways in which a government can make its shipbuilding credit more attractive 
than commercial bank credit to the shipowner. 
- Government guarantee: Here the government stands as a guarantee for the shipowner’s 
loan, hence helping the firm to borrow from a commercial bank. The value of the guarantee 
depends on the credit standards that the government agency applies in issuing the guarantee. 
- Interest rate subsidy: Here the government subsidizes the interest rate that the shipowner 
has to pay for the debt financing.  
- Moratorium: A moratorium refers to a period of time in which there is a suspension on 
interest or principal payments. This is typically agreed upon with the government in difficult 
times, in order to lighten the burden and give the firm time to stabilize itself. A moratorium 
usually does not last longer than one or two years. 
Today, most financing of new acquisitions within the shipping industry is incorporated under 
this governmental credit scheme. The most significant shipbuilding countries all have such 
schemes in order to stay competitive. Examples of such institutions carrying out these 
schemes are the Export Credit Bank of Japan, the KEXIM bank of South Korea, the EXIM 
bank of China, and Eksportfinans and GIEK in Norway (Stopford, 2009). 
6.3 Private placements  
Private placements can, as earlier described, either be an offering of equity or debt security 
to individuals or a small group of accredited investors. Debt private placements refer, in 
more detail, to a bond issue that is not trade on the public market, but rather offered to a 
selected small group of investors. It can, as with bank loans, also be divided up into secured 
or unsecured and senior or junior placements. Like its equity equivalent, the advantage with 
this type of financing compared to other tradable securities, is that it does not need to be 
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registered with the SEC in the United States. You are hence able to secure financing much 
quicker than what you would be able to do with similar tradable securities. Furthermore, you 
do not need to conform to the same standards as of public debt. You are therefore allowed a 
larger degree of tailoring of products. Advantages from this tailoring include the possibility 
of fixed interest rate or long duration (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011). 
6.4 Public Debt 
Public debt is debt that is publically traded and is often referred to as bonds. A bond is a 
fixed-obligation debt security. The premise of such a security is that the issuer sells a 
certificate of debt to an investor. In return, the issuer promises to pay back the investor the 
whole amount (the principal) at the maturity of the bond. Between the issuing date and the 
maturity, the issuer is also obligated to pay, at pre-determined dates, an agreed upon interest 
rate on the principal. This interest rate is known as the coupon rate.
 
 
The coupon rate the issuer offers depends upon the respective interbank rate (the interest rate 
that banks charge each other for internal bank loans), the duration of the bond and the credit 
rating the borrower has. If it becomes more expensive to borrow, then this will be reflected 
in the interest rate. Similarly, as estimating the credit worthiness of the borrower gets harder 
the longer into the future one goes, longer maturity bonds usually needs a higher coupon rate 
than shorter ones. This phenomenon is referred to as the credit curve. Furthermore, if the 
credit rating is bad, this implies that there is risk of default. The lender will therefore require 
an interest rate above the risk free rate (what he/she could get without taking any credit risk), 
leading to an increasing of the coupon rate
 
(Bodie, Kane, Marcus, 2011). 
The credit rating is decided by the rating agencies. The most worldwide-recognized rating 
agencies are Standard & Poor (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch Rating. Between these there are 
two different rating systems. Moody's assigns bond credit ratings from Aaa to C, where Aaa 
represent the best and C the worst. They divide each letter group ex (Aa) into three, where 
three indicates that the company is considered to be at the lowest segment of the letter group.  
S&P and Fitch, rate based on a different system than Moody’s, where AAA rated companies 
are considered to be the safest and D rated firms is the lowest rated class of companies. Each 
letter grouping here receives a plus, a minus or neither based on its rating within that 
particular rating group. Even though the rating systems differ, the systems are fairly similar, 
and firms are often rated in the “similar” class. The difference is illustrated in Figure 4. We 
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have here not included the segment of each letter group (1,2,3 /+,-) (Moody’s, 
2009)(Standard & Poor, n.d). 
Figure 4: Bond Rating 
 
Source: (Yahoo Finance, n.d.) 
An important distinction when considering bonds, is to separate between investment grade 
and junk bonds. All bonds rated BBB or higher are considered investment grade. Those 
below are called junk bonds, or high-yield bonds. The issuers of such bonds typically tend to 
have high leverage ratios, often as high as 90-95%, which causes them to have significantly 
higher probability of default (Brealey et al., 2008). It is quite normal that hedge funds and 
mutual funds have investment policies restricting their purchase of this type of bonds, 
forcing the companies to offer an even higher interest rate in order to attract sufficient capital 
(Illustrated by the investment policy of the world’s largest mutual fund company) 
(Investment Policy Statement, 2009). 
6.4.1 Securitization of Public Debt 
One can with bonds, as with private debt, divide public debt up according to its seniority and 
degree of secured claims. Unsecure public debt can be divided up according to maturity into 
notes and debentures, while secured public debt can be separated into mortgage bonds and 
asset backed bonds. 
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A note is a written promise to pay a specific sum of money on a certain date. A note 
typically has maturity between 1 and 10 years, which is shorter than the maturity of a 
debenture. Both these are unsecured meaning that in case of bankruptcy the bondholders 
only have claim on the assets not already pledged as collateral for another debt (Berk, 
DeMarzo, 2011). 
Mortgage-backed bonds and asset-backed bonds, are similar to the same type of loans 
discussed above, secured by specific assigned collateral. Mortgage bonds are secured in real 
property, while asset backed bonds are secured in any kind of asset (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011). 
6.4.2 Bonds Repayment provisions 
Typically a bond is repaid, by the issuer making its coupon payments during the duration of 
the bond, and finally the principal at the end of maturity. There are, however, other ways for 
the issuer to repay the bond. The issuer can for instance repurchase a portion of the 
outstanding bonds in the market, or make a tender offer for the entire issue (A public 
takeover bid to buy all bonds outstanding at a specified price during a specified time, subject 
to the tendering of a minimum and maximum number of shares).  
Another way for the issuer to repay bonds is to exercise a call provision, which allows the 
issuer to repurchase the bonds at a predetermined price, given that such a provision is 
implemented in the bond. This type of bond is referred to as a callable bond. A different 
version of a callable bond is a convertible bond, where the holder of the bond has a warrant 
on the bond, meaning an option to convert the bond into common stock in the 
issuing company or cash of equivalent value, at a predetermined price (Berk, DeMarzo, 
2011). 
This type of bond is often issued by shipping companies. Convertible bonds carry a lower 
coupon rate than a similar bond without the warrant option, and are often subordinate to 
other debt. The lower coupon rate can be explained by the imbedded warrant option, which 
makes the bond more attractive, and hence require a lower coupon rate in order to attract 
investors (Brennan, Schwartz 1980).  
In the shipping industry, bonds are often unsecured (78 % of all bonds issued in 2012 were 
senior unsecured bonds (Weltman, 2013), and most bonds also have relatively short tenors, 
with the most regular being a five-year maturity (Lian, Liu, Lin, Yeh 2006). This implies 
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that notes are the most used type of corporate bonds in this industry. Furthermore, the 
shipping industry’s risk profile can be rated as BB (Kindahl, 2008), 
 
given the high volatility in the 
freight market, the high leverage ratio and competitive factors within the shipping industry.  
The most relevant bond market to consider, as a way of financing for the shipping industry, 
is hence the high-yield market. 
6.4.3 Bonds as means of financing for shipping 
In order to examine the suitability of bonds as a mean of financing for the shipping industry, 
one needs to consider the underlying characteristics of the shipping industry.  The industry is 
highly cyclical and volatile both in terms of freight rates and asset values. Most firms are 
heavily geared, as it is a capital-intensive industry, and the asset life expectancy is quite 
long; with the expectancy depending on the particular shipping segment. Such characteristics 
may suggest that it might be hard for shipping companies to stay within covenants or make 
coupons if the market is in a trough.  
6.4.4 High-Yield bonds and its role in ship financing up until 2005  
We will in this section briefly go through the history of high-yield bonds in relation to 
shipping, and discuss its suitability as a source of capital in the shipping industry.  
The history of the high-yield bond market is a fairly short one. The market arose in the US, 
in the 1980s, when investment bankers realized that investors were willing to invest in 
former investment grade companies that had been downgraded. Even though the market had 
been around for decades, the activity in the market had been close to nothing. In the 1980s, 
the investments bankers, led by Drexel Burnham Lambert and Michael Milken, found these 
so called “fallen angels” to be systematically undervalued, and hence started offering bond 
issues to finance small and medium sized companies that were unable to achieve an 
investment grade rating. In the 1980s, this market was further fuelled by the growing use of 
leveraged finance acquisitions, which used high-yield bonds as the main source of capital 
(Taggart, 1987). As the bottom fell out of the market in the early 1990s, the default rates rose 
for high-yield bonds, and the market encountered its first down cycle (Grammenos, 
Papapostolou, 2012). Drexel Burnham Lambert went bankrupt, while several major investors 
were barred from buying new high-yield bonds and were forced to liquidate their high-yield 
bond positions (Altman, 2012). By the end of the 1990s, default rates peaked at 11 percent 
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(Helwe, Kleinman 1996). Since then, the market has strengthened and continued to grow as 
a source of financing in the international capital market area.  
As a mean of ship financing, the first bond offer by a shipping company took place in 1992, 
when Sea Containers Ltd. issued $125 million of subordinated debentures. Since then many 
issues have taken place. By June 2011, $16,6 billion of fresh capital has been raised, and 83 
issues had taken place (Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012). After the initial offering in 1992, 
annual shipping bond offerings stabilized before slowly growing until its first peak in 1997-
98 (Marine Money Offshore, n.d). During this period, many shipping firms took advantage 
of the booming market conditions, and between June 1996 and December 1997, $6 billion 
worth of high-yield bonds were issued to shipping companies in the US (Lloyd's List, 2010). 
When the shipping market dropped again in mid-98 and 99, caused by the Asian and Russian 
financial crisis, many of these issues defaulted. In 1999, shipping public debt default rate 
reached alarmingly 38% in the US, compared to the overall public debt default rate of 1.28% 
(Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012). This occurrence hit the investors hard, and smeared the 
shipping industry’s reputation as a bond issuer for years to come. Regardless of this, the 
shipping high-yield market again re-emerged in 2003, as China moved into a period of 
serious infrastructure development. The following years will be covered in our analysis, and 
we will hence not discuss it here in order to avoid redundancy.    
6.4.5 Advantages of using bonds 
When considering bonds as means of financing there are several aspects to consider. Starting 
with the advantages, the bond market firstly offers shipowners a massive pool of alternative 
capital to exploit, this market being especially relevant when the capital market condition 
tightens. Secondly, by including bonds in your financing portfolio you further diversify you 
capital source, as it is likely to already be overweighed towards bank loans (Falck, 
2013)(Gilson, Warner, 1998). Third, given that a bond does not require an amortization of 
the principal, financing through bonds may also raise the cash flow breakeven, and through 
that enable the firm to take greater advantage of its interest tax shield. This advantage is of 
course given that the firm is situated in a country that taxes the shipping industry (Falck, 
2013). 
Considering financial flexibility, junk bonds can provide a higher degree of flexibility 
compared to bank loans. Firstly, the covenant restriction that follows with a bond is minimal 
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compared to what is required for a syndicate loan (Hale, Santos, 2006) (Albertijn, Toepfer, 
Besler, Drobetz, 2011). Such restrictions can lead to lost opportunities if they prevent the 
firm from investing in positive net present value projects (Smith, Warner, 1979). Secondly, 
as bonds generally are more often unsecured compared with bank loans, this allows the 
issuer greater flexibility in managing its assets (Gilson, Warner, 1997).
 
Thirdly, as the 
principal only has to be repaid at maturity and the bond only requires the borrower to pay 
coupons during the lending period, the issuer increases its financial flexibility. This allows 
the shipowner to either invest the freed up capital in projects, expand their fleet or take on 
more bank loans by using the available capital to repay other debt obligation already 
outstanding (Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012)(Falck, 2013).  
An alternative to bond financing is of course to raise equity through issuance of new shares, 
but by doing so shareholders share may get diluted (Berk DeMarzo, 2011).  Secondly, the 
bond process offers a larger degree of certainty of execution and is considerably less time 
consuming than what an IPO offering would have been. Thirdly, by issuing a bond you are 
also required to do considerably fewer disclosures than what an IPO offering entails 
(Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012).  
Lastly, for firms that do not have had much exposure to the financial market, a bond issuance 
provides valuable experience for firms that in the long run plan to make an IPO offering. If 
the firm also has not previously been exposed to the public market, an issuance of a bond 
would require a greater discipline from the management, as the investor now will monitor 
them. Such supervision can help reduce typical agency costs such as empire building and 
suboptimal capital structure (Kaplan, Atkinson, 1998). Through a bond issuance, a firm can 
also improve its credibility and publicity in the public market, which may improve its 
standing with its current debt provider (Hale, Santos, 2006). 
6.4.6 Disadvantages of using bonds 
Considering the negative aspects of a bond issuance, it is an expensive source of capital. 
Bonds are expensive both in terms of the initial outlay needed to complete the issue, as well 
as the high interest payments that follows the bond during its duration (Hale, Santos, 2006). 
Furthermore, as the interest payments also are so significant, it becomes very expensive to 
hold the capital without investing it, and such financing hence normally requires a speedy 
 39 
investment. This leaves little time for consideration after receiving the capital (Grammenos, 
Papapostolou, 2012). 
The repayment structure of a bond normally entails a large sum due at maturity. This lump 
sum represents a refinancing risk. Most issuers tend to deal with this issue by rolling over the 
bullet payment into a new bond, and hence funding the principal with the new bond (Falck, 
2013). Such strategy does, however, rely heavily on a well-functioning liquid market, and 
could force many companies into financial distress if for instance the market dried up like it 
did during the financial crisis (Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, Lando, 2010). At today’s market, 
however, as long as the debt has been serviced during its contractual period and the borrower 
is in solid financial shape, refinancing should not be a big issue. The refinancing risk may 
also be reduced by buying back part of the issue at a discount during its duration, if the 
market conditions allow it. Such repurchase is usually possible after the first few years, in 
which there usually is a “no call” provision (Berk, DeMarzo, 2011). 
We earlier talked about financial flexibility, comparing bonds and bank loans, and gave 
several reasons why a bond would be more flexible. We do, however, not believe that junk 
bond dominate bank loans on this matter. As presented earlier, bank loans also come as 
revolving line of credit. Such an option can give great flexibility, enabling growing firm 
quick access to capital.  
Relying on bonds oppose to bank loan financing can also be a risky in case of financial 
distress, with risk of breaching covenants or inability to cover interest payments. With 
bonds, you namely lose the aspect of personal interface you get with a bank loan. Where you 
with a bank loan can relate to one specific banker, with whom you have a personal 
relationship and perhaps a history of financial involvements (Petersen, Rajan, 1994), you 
will with a bond need to deal with a representative for all of the bondholders, in Norway 
called “Norsk Tillitsmann”, described in section 7.3. This is a representative, which whom 
you are unlikely to have neither a personal relationship with nor any past or future business 
with. He/she will hence have little incentive to compromise/ be flexible in a situation of 
financial distress and will only have his/her bondholder’s interest in focus, even though this 
might not be the best solution in the long run (Falck, 2013).  
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Another aspect to consider in this regard is the lack of transparency. By this, we refer to the 
fact that with a bond the bond buyers are not obligated to reveal their identity. In such a 
system, one/several investors may buy a large portion of the bond with intentions of 
bankrupting/ taking over the company in the case of a breach of covenant or lack of interest 
payments. The owners of a bond have in other words a big influence on the company. 
Michael Milken, one of the pioneers of high-yield bond market, underlined this treat by 
declaring: “if you miss one payment, we will take the company away” (Milken, n.d). By 
financing with bonds, you hence lose the flexibility a bank with a long-term relationship 
offers you, and you risk meeting less understanding lender in the case of financial distress 
(Falck, 2013). 
Incorporated with a bond issue there are several regulatory requirements. First of all, prior to 
the issue, the company is obligated to hire an accounting firm in order to get its books 
audited. This will entail an increased annual accounting expense (Falck, 2013). Going public 
also entails that the firm will be under close surveillance by the respective governmental 
body overviewing the relevant securities exchange, in the United States this body is called 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Falck, 2013). From firms issuing bonds, 
SEC requires quarterly and annual reports that comply with the Sarbannes Oxley act. If the 
firm already has already gone public, it already has to comply with such regulations and the 
issuance of a bond will provide very little extra work. If, however, it is a private company, 
then such an issue will require considerably more effort, and can present concerns about 
privacy and use of management’s time (Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012). Gao (2011) finds 
that foreign firms that are not already listed on the US stock exchange, comply with IFRS 
standards, or issue large bonds, are less likely to use the US bond market after the Sarbannes 
Oxley act.  
For a private company, deciding to go public also results in a greater sensitivity to its public 
rating. It now needs to consider the effects the firm’s actions will have on its public rating, 
and how the public rating might affect the business (Falck, 2013).  
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7. Key Fundamental Insight 
In this section we will discuss three key topics related to the different asset classes of 
funding.  
7.1 Basel 
The Basel requirements, also known as the Basel Accord, are a set of minimum capital 
requirements for the banking industry, agreed upon by the G-10
1
 central banks, through 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The BCBS is a committee 
established by the central bank governors of the G-10 countries in 1974 as a response to the 
troubled liquidation of Hersatt Bank (BIS, n.d). 
 The initial accord was established by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in 1988, 
and is referred to as Basel I. This accord was voluntarily enforced by law in the G-10 
countries in 1992. Since then, the requirements have been updated and developed, and 
several other countries have enforced the requirements. A new set of rules were introduced, 
that went by the name of Basel II, and a following update, known as Basel III, was agreed 
upon in 2010-2011. The accord will gradually be introduced, before being put in to full 
effect by 2019. 
The Basel I Accord sets forth a framework for measuring capital adequacy and proposes a 
minimum standard of capital to be demanded for international banks in adopting countries. 
In Basel I, BCBS divided up the banks’ assets into five categories according to how much 
credit risk each category possessed. Each category was given a certain degree of risk 
percentage in the range of (0-100). Stated simply, all banks with international presence were 
required to have at least 8 percent of the value of its risk-weighted assets as buffer capital. 
By risk-weighted assets, they refer to assets weighted according to the level of perceived risk 
that each asset category represents, and how each off-balance-sheet exposure is converted 
and weighted accordingly to its equivalent amount of assets (Basel, 1988).
 
 
                                                 
1
 G-10 countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, The United 
Kingdom, The United States, Germany, and Sweden) 
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In Basel II, further efforts were made to significantly mitigate the credit risk of banks. This 
was done by strengthening the regulatory capital framework for large banks with 
international exposure. This was accomplished through minimum capital requirements that 
were more sensitive to the institutions' risk profile and also provided strengthened incentives 
for stronger risk management. In Basel II, the committee introduced three different pillars on 
which the requirements were built on (Federal Reserve, n.d).  
Pillar 1 requires banks to hold a minimum total capital level of 8% as a function of their risk 
level, similar to what was proposed in Basel I. What has changed from the initial Basel 
accord is the definition of risk-weighted assets and the division of capital. The hallmark of 
Basel II is the alteration in the treatment of risk, as well as the explicit incorporation of 
operational risk in risk-weighted assets. The bank capital has been divided up into two tiers: 
Tier I and Tier II capital. A requirement for the degree of Tier I capital has also been set. 
After Basel II, each bank is required to have 4% of Tier I capital, and common equity of 2 
%, known as core Tier I capital. 
In Pillar 2, the administration will evaluate the activities and risk profiles of each individual 
bank in order to decide whether the organization needs to adjust and consequently hold more 
capital than the minimum requirements of Pillar 1. The concept is hence that well-managed 
banks should seek to go beyond simple compliance with the minimum capital requirements, 
and perform a comprehensive assessment of whether they have sufficient capital to support 
their own individual risk profile. These assessments are known as Internal Capital Adequacy 
Process (ICAAP) (BIS, 2009).  
In Pillar 3, the Basel accord seeks to complement the framework set forward in Pillar 1 and 
2, by improving transparency of the banking sector. Pillar 3 aims to do this by requiring the 
banks to publish details on the scope of their operations, capital, risk exposure, risk 
assessment processes, and capital adequacy. These disclosures are required to be made at 
least twice a year, except for the qualitative disclosures, which are only needed annually and 
provide a summary of the general risk management objectives and policies. This pillar 
allows the public to evaluate the individual bank's risk profile, level of capitalization and 
whether the information presented by the company actually correlates with how the 
management assesses and manages the institution’s risks. It is seen as a particularly 
important pillar, since Basel II allows some banks to rely more heavily on internal risk 
assessment methods. This gives them greater power in determining their own capital needs. 
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The latest update of the Basel accord is Basel III. It was developed as a response to the 
financial regulatory gaps that came into light after the recent financial crisis. The accord 
introduces stricter capital requirements and new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity 
and bank leverage (BIS, 2009). 
Basel III requires banks to hold 4.5% of common equity (up from 2% in Basel II) and 6% of 
Tier I capital (up from 4% in Basel II) of risk-weighted assets (RWA).  
Basel III also introduces: additional capital buffers, a minimum leverage ratio, and two 
liquidity ratios. 
(i) Capital conservation buffer  
a. The banks are expected to hold a core capital degree of 2.5% in addition to 
the minimum capital requirement. 
(ii)  Countercyclical buffer  
a.  In order to protect the banks against obligations of strong credit growth, the 
national regulators are allowed to require up to another 2.5% of capital of 
counter cyclical buffer, during periods of high credit growth. 
(iii) Minimum leverage ratio above 3% 
a. In order to prevent firms of levering up too much, hence exposing themselves 
to high credit risk, a minimum leverage ratio of 3% has been put in place. The 
ratio is calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by the bank's average total 
consolidated assets. 
(iv) Liquidity ratios. 
a) The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
The LCR is implemented to promote the short-term resilience of a 
banks' liquidity risk profile. It achieves this by requiring that a bank 
holds an adequate stock of high-quality liquid assets that can be 
converted into cash immediately in private markets, in order to meet 
its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario. This 
requirement will strengthen the banking sector's ability to absorb 
shocks arising from financial and economic stress, thus reducing the 
risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. 
b) The Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
 This ratio aims to ensure banks are able to survive an extended closure 
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 of wholesale funding markets. The Net stable funding ratio establishes 
 a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding to exceed the required 
 amount of stable funding over a one-year period of extended stress. 
 The ratio comes as a response to severe shortage of funding many 
 banks experienced in the recent crisis, caused by their significant 
 reliance of short term funding through the interbank market.  
7.1.1 Critics 
Even though it is clear that a further tightening of the financial regulatory system was 
needed, critics of the accord have claimed that the greater regulation is responsible for the 
slow recovery of the world economy. Tighter Basel III requirements may further negatively 
affect the stability of the financial system, by increasing the incentives of banks to game the 
regulatory framework (Taylor, 2012)(Suttle, 2011). 
7.1.2 The Basel Accord’s effect on the Banking industry 
Following the latest change in the Basel Accord; many banks have been struggling to fulfill 
the requirements set forward. As we have discussed, the required quality of the minimum 
capital has increased and several additional capital buffers have been required. This has 
forced the banks to readjust their balance in order to optimize the use of equity.  
With the new set of rules, the required equity has increased for previous similar risk. This 
forces the banks to either raise more equity or reduce the risk associated with their portfolio. 
The later option is related to the fact that the capital requirements are relative to the banks' 
assets. This is being implemented through risk weighted assets (RWA), where the equity 
requirements are dependent upon the riskiness of the assets (Accenture, 2011). 
Looking into the first option of raising equity, banks can either; issue shares, sell assets or 
increase retained earnings by increasing their revenues or reducing costs. As the banking 
deposit marked is close to perfectly competitive, charging interest rates above the average 
marked rates is not sustainable in the long run. In addition, this would be a strategy of high 
risk, as deposits often represent 30-40% of the bank's funding (Gade Greve, 2013). Banks 
hence rarely turn to this option in order to increase revenues. Following the fall of the 
market, several banks have downsized, and made cuts in less crucial areas. This has 
happened either by selling out some of the assets or reducing staff. Unfortunately, however, 
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given the current market state, these sales often happen at prices under book value, leading 
to a reduction in equity. Furthermore, the revenue of the banks has also fallen, causing the 
efforts of cost reduction to be insufficient in order to reach the required equity levels of the 
Basel Accord (Accenture, 2011). 
Furthermore, most banks are reluctant to issue shares, mainly due to the fear of diluting 
shareholders and putting negative pressure on the stock price. Increasing equity levels have 
therefore proven to be a difficult task in the current state of the market. Most banks have 
consequently seen the need to trim their portfolios’ of the most risky loans, and thus 
reducing their risk-weighted assets. This have led several banks to turn to their big 
customers, which are exposed to high volatility, and make large cuts in funding in sectors 
such as industry and shipping. (KPMG, 2011). 
7.2 Liquidation of a firm 
When a firm cannot meet its debt obligations the firm is in default. The creditors can then 
take legal action against the firm to collect the outstanding payments by taking control over 
the firm's assets. Hence the control of the firm is transferred from the equityholders to the 
debtholders. Since a firm generally has several creditors there exist bankruptcy codes to 
ensure fairness and coordination between the creditors. These codes differ from country to 
country and so does also the friendliness towards the creditors and debtors. US and French 
courts for example, are known to be friendlier towards the debtors than the creditors by 
favouring the current management and the continuance of the firm as a going concern. This 
thereby creates an incentive for firms to seek bankruptcy protection in US courts, as for 
example the LPG tanker firm Navigator Gas did, instead of in the Isle of Man (De Lacy, 
Michael Fay, 2012).  
Since firms generally have multiple creditors there exists a hierarchy that states the priority 
of claims for the different debtholders. This hierarchy is known as the "Absolute Priority 
Rule" (APR) and can be seen in Figure 5. The rule states that in the case of liquidation, 
secured debtholders are paid first. This refers to debtholders that given the large risk of 
default have required their loans/bond to be securitized against the assets of the firm. When 
the firm goes into default, the bank or bondholder will then try to recover the outstanding 
debt by taking control of the collateral that secured the loan. Their claims are hence a 
priority as long as the secured assets cover their outstanding debt. Senior unsecured creditors 
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will have second priority, while subordinate debtholders have the lowest seniority of the 
creditors. Banks are the predominant users of securitized debt, while bondholders will seek 
compensation in form of higher expected yield due to the increased ratio of loss given 
default. The loss given default depends on the characteristics of the borrowing company, the 
asset value under liquidation and the economic condition. 
 Equityholders have the lowest priority and will only receive value when creditors have been 
paid. This is not always the case, as there exists deviations to the APR (Eberhart, Weiss 
1998). This can be due to the individual circumstances of the firm and the country the 
bankruptcy is being processed in. 
 
Figure 5: Seniority Hierarchy 
Source:  (Gestel, Baesnes, 2009) 
The rating agency Moody's has compiled a database of the recovery rates for debtholders 
holding different priorities in non-financial US corporations. The database dates back from 
1987 and consists of over 3500 loans and bonds taken from 720 non-financical coperations. 
Figure 6 shows the recovery rate for the different seniorities. The higher the seniority, the 
more the creditor will one average recover.  
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Figure 6: Recovery Rate 
Source: (Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database, n.d.) 
7.3 Norsk Tillitsmann/ Norwegian Trustee 
The Norwegian Trustee is an independent bond trustee that acts as the link between 
bondholders and the issuing firm. In Norway, 95% of the bonds have a trustee arrangement. 
During the past five years, the trustee has seen an increase in high-yield bonds from the oil, 
offshore and shipping sector.  
The main roles of the trustee are related to documentation, monitoring and crisis 
management. The documentation responsibility includes preparation of loan agreements and 
security documents with respective parties. The monitoring responsibility consists of making 
sure the firm is meeting the obligations to the bondholders. The most important 
responsibility is the crisis management role, where the trustee handles the restructuring 
process and protects the rights of the creditors.  
Benefits of using a trustee from the issuers’ perspective 
By using a trustee, the issuer will only have one single point of contact when addressing the 
bondholders. Should there be need to make minor changes to the loan agreement, the trustee 
has the authority to act on behalf of the bondholders. In addition, the trustee may act as a 
sparring partner for the issuer.  
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The fact that the trustee is the single point of contact between the issuer and the creditors 
protects the issuer from dealing with single bondholders during distress. The creditors 
themselves cannot go directly to the issuing firm and demand a settlement, but have to go 
through the trustee. The trustee agreement typically requires 2/3 majority to perform any 
actions towards the issuing firm. 
Benefits from the bondholders' perspective 
Since one of the main tasks of the trustee is to monitor and take action should the loan 
agreement be broken, this greatly reduces the monitoring costs of each bondholder. As 
mentioned earlier, decisions require 2/3 majority by the bondholders, this thereby limits the 
power of bondholders with special interest, and for the most part secures equal treatment for 
all bondholders (Norwegian Trustee, n.d). 
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8. Method 
In this chapter we will describe the inferential statistics we have used for our analysis. 
8.1 T-Test 
The t-test is a statistical test that can be used to determine whether there is a statistical 
significant difference between two populations’ means. For our analysis, we will use the 
one-tailed t-test to determine if there has been a decrease or increase of the respective 
variable from the pre to the post financial crisis data.  
 
To perform the one-tailed t-test, we have to create two hypotheses: 
H0: There is no difference between the two populations means, µ1 = µ2. 
H1: The mean of the first group is greater than the second. µ1 > µ2. 
H1: The mean of the first group is less than the second group. µ1 < µ2. 
Using a significance level of 5%, an observed t-value equal to or greater than 1.645(µ1 > µ2) 
and equal to or less than -1.645(µ1 < µ2), will create a significant result leading us to reject 
the null hypothesis. This range of numbers is known as the rejection region, and tells us to 
reject the null hypothesis should the test statistics be within these values.  
8.2 P-Value 
The use of the rejection region method has a number of disadvantages. The most prominent 
drawback is the yes or no answer the method provides. To better understand the reasoning 
for rejecting the null-hypothesis, one can use the p-value.  
The p-value is defined as “the probability of observing a test statistic at least as extreme as 
the one computed given that the null hypothesis is true” (Keller, 2008). In other words, the 
p- value measures the statistical support for the H1 hypothesis.  
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The null hypothesis states that the means of the two group are equal, thus the closer the 
means are to each other, the larger the p-value will be and vice versa. The smaller the p-
value is, the more significant the result, hence leading us to reject the null-hypothesis.  
The degree of statistical significance for p-values: 
P < 0.01  Highly Significant 
0.01<P<0.05 Significant 
P > 0.05  Not Significant 
If the p-value exceeds 0.1, the alternative hypothesis is not true and therefore the null-
hypothesis will be kept.  
For the analysis of our shipping data, we will use the p-value instead of the rejection range 
method to determine if to keep or reject the null-hypothesis.  
8.3 Wilcoxon Ranked Sum/Mann Whitney U Test 
When the data points are not normally distributed, one can theoretical not use the t-test. In 
this case, one will have to use a non-parametric hypothesis test, like the Wilcoxon Ranked 
Sum/Mann Whitney-U test to compare populations that are non-normally distributed. 
However, in this test you are not actually comparing means, but the median of the two 
populations (Lowry, n.d). 
To determine if the dataset is normally distributed, we have utilized the Shapiro-Wilk test for 
data samples of less than 2000. The test tests the hypothesis that the sample is normally 
distributed, in other words, if the result is significant and we reject the null hypothesis, then 
the data is not normally distributed (Shapiro, Wilk, 1965).  
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8.4 Two sample proportion test 
The sampling test can be used to test if two proportion of a population are statistically 
different.   
Proportion is defined as:   , where x is the number of observations and n is the sample 
size. 
-  represents the proportion of sample 1. 
-   represents the proportion of sample 2. 
-   represents the pooled proportions of sample 1 and 2.  
 
To perform the test, we will have to create a hypothesis test.  
H0: There is no statistical difference between the two populations proportions,  = . 
H1: The proportion of population 1 is greater than the proportion of population 2,  > . 
H1: The proportion of population 1 is less than the proportion of population 2,   < . 
Using a significance level of 5%, the null hypothesis will be rejected when z is greater than 
1.645 (  > ) and less than -1.645(  < .) However, for our analysis we will use the p-
value to determine when to keep and when to reject the null hypothesis (Keller, 2008). 
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9. Data Sample 
The financial data collected is the cornerstone of our analysis and we have therefore 
dedicated a section to briefly explain how we found the data and how we segmented it for 
analysis.  
The data used in this analysis has been collected from Marine Money’s deal database and 
Clarksons’ transaction database. The Marine Money and Clarksons database contains deals 
recorded by them, while Dealogic has provided the bank loan data. A brief introduction to 
the various contributors: Marine Money is a world-renowned financial publication within the 
maritime industry, Clarksons is the world-leading provider of integrated shipping services, 
whereas Dealogic is a global provider of real-time financial services information, much like 
Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters.  
The database consists of numerous type of deals executed within the maritime industry 
ranging from 2000 to 2013. Since the Marine Money database is a live-database where new 
deals are constantly being added, we decided to extract all information used from this 
database at one point of time in order to avoid the risk of conflicting samples. The data used 
in this thesis was collected on the 11
th
 of April. To better assess the change in financial 
structure within the shipping industry, we have segmented the maritime companies into 10 
different categories: 
- Shipping: Consists of companies that transport commodities and merchandise goods 
by sea.  
- Offshore: Consists of companies that are directly related to development of oil and 
gas fields.  
- Terminals: Companies operating terminals or ports. 
- Containers: Companies that build and lease containers to the shipping segment. 
- Barge: Companies using barges to transport goods in rivers or canals.  
- Cruise Lines: Includes companies operating ferries and cruises.  
- Maritime Services: Companies that perform services for companies operating in the 
maritime sector.  
- Dredging/Tugging: Consists of companies performing dredging and tugging 
activities.  
- Financial Providers: Includes companies that provide financial services. 
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Furthermore, we have also segmented the financial institutions involved in the transactions 
after nationality in order to assess where there has been the most activity, and whether there 
have been shift between various regions. We have therefore divided the financial institutions 
up into five subcategorizes: 
-Asia 
-Europe 
-Middle East 
-North America 
-Scandinavia 
We have decided to separate Scandinavia from the rest of Europe, as much of the world’s 
ship financing comes from this region, and we furthermore expect there to be a significant 
increase of bond issuance from this area.   
By segmenting the companies, as well as the financial institutions, into different categories 
we have created a flexible dataset, where we have had the possibility to add and extract data 
throughout the process of writing this thesis. With guidance from our advisor, we have 
decided that we, in the end, wish to focus on merely the shipping segment of our maritime 
data. We have done this in order to narrow our thesis and hopefully improve the validity of 
our work.  
9.1 Timeframe 
For our analysis we have chosen to split the dataset into two time periods, Pre and Post, to 
better assess the changes before and after the recent financial crisis. The Pre period consists 
of data ranging from 01.01.2005 until 31.08.2008, while the Post period ranges from 
01.09.2008 till 31.12.2012. The reason we have chosen to split the dataset at the turn of the 
month of august 2008 is because we wanted to capture the whole effect leading up to the 
events that unfolded in the middle of September. The bankruptcy of the investment bank, 
Lehman Brothers, on September 15
th
 2008, created a cataclysmic ripple effect that threw the 
global financial markets into turmoil. 
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Almost immediately after the investment bank filed for chapter 11, the money market, which 
acts as a key source of credit for banks, dried up due to the vast amount of money being 
withdrawn from the market. The TED spread, indicating the risk of interbank lending, surged 
after the Lehman collapse, making it hard and expensive to attain credit. The subsequent 
credit freeze paralyzed the global financial markets, almost bringing the markets down 
(Klovland, 2011). One can argue that the financial crisis already began in 2007, and 
therefore the dataset should be split at an earlier point, however, it was not before September 
2008 that the market collapsed, leading to the greatest economic crisis since the Great 
Depression.  
It should also be noted that we have decided to exclude the entries prior to 2005 as well as 
those of 2013.The reason behind deciding to exclude the dataset prior to 2005 is that the 
number of transactions gathered per year where so few for 2003-04 that it made the authors 
question the credibility of the sample. Regarding our reason not to include the data from 
2013, we concluded that as we will not been able to receive data for the whole year prior to 
submitting our thesis. Including these transactions could give a false impression of the 
current financial situation, and will hence not be considered. 
9.2 Merging the Marine Money and Clarkson database 
After first focusing purely on the entries provided from Marine Money, we decided, after 
discussing the validity of the sample with our advisor, to merge the entries concerning 
Convertible Bonds, Certified Bonds, IPOs and FOs provided by Marine Money with the 
dataset provide by Clarksons from their Shipping Intelligence Network database. The 
reasons for this were two-fold. For one, the Clarksons database possessed more detail 
information concerning bonds, allowing us to better analyze both the interest rates and tenor 
of our bonds transactions. Secondly, we noticed that there were some discrepancies between 
the two databases. The data for bank loans were collected by Dealogic on an aggregate level, 
through close collaboration with the banking industry, while the information for Bonds, 
IPOs and FOs were collected by Marine Money as an outside operator, which relies on them 
being on top of the market at all times. We thus felt the accuracy of the bank loan data was 
likely to be greater, even though we are aware that Dealogic do not receive transaction 
information from all bank issuing loans. Since it is virtually impossible to include all deals 
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made on a worldwide basis, we hence decided to include the data collected by Clarksons on 
these areas of financing, in order to improve the validity of our results.  
9.3 Shipping Database Description 
The newly created Shipping database have been forged by the authors segmenting the 
different companies into the above described categorizes through researching each individual 
company online. The overall data collected consists of 3140 different deals conducted from 
the period 01.01.2003 to 13.03.2013. In our analysis, we have used data ranging from 
01.01.2005 to 31.12.2012, which accounts for 1991 deals when only focusing on the 
shipping segment. 
As we have converted a maritime database into a pure shipping database, certain selection 
decisions can be useful to be informed of. For one, as we are looking on a dataset comprising 
of data from 8 years of transactions, including both peaks and troughs, several of the 
included companies have either merged or been acquired since the start of the period. We 
have hence decided to pool all merged/acquired firms into the new parent company, even 
though some of the transactions have been done prior to the completion of the deal. We have 
done this in order to keep the consistency of the data, and also enabling us to better judge the 
trend of the market. Secondly, several of the firms included in the sample are large global 
operators with different divisions. In order to better follow the activity of the company as a 
whole, as well as more easily read financing trends, we have decided to consolidate the data 
for such companies and hence merge all entries coming from different subsections of the 
same firm/group under one. Such global operators nationality have also been based on their 
location of headquarter. This may cause some discrepancies compared to where the actual 
deal has been made.  
9.4 Assumptions 
Since the data is collected from three well-renowned firms in the capital markets of the 
maritime industry, we consider the data used in our analysis to be close to accurate. We have 
furthermore assumed that all deals not included in the Clarkson/Marine money dataset, but 
that exists in the other, have not been detected and should hence be included in our data. 
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9.5 Bond Interest Rate 
As parts of the data provided on the bonds coupon rates were given in floating rate (3 month 
interbank rate + credit spread), while others were provided at fixed rate, we have adjusted 
the three-month floating interbank rate to a fixed rate. This has been done in order to better 
compare the coupon rates from the pre and post period. Such conversion was done by 
looking up the fixing rate for, both LIBOR and NIBOR, of each individual issuance, on the 
respective issuing date using Teletrader (2013). 
9.6 Total Financing Need 
To better understand how the underlying financing need in shipping has developed during 
our period of analysis, we have created a proxy. Together with our advisor and an industry 
professional (Greve, 2013), we have determined that the Panamax bulk carrier class is a 
representative average for the industry. The Panamax class is a ship class that is within the 
limits and size of the requirements to travel through the Panama Canal in South-America.  
To calculate the proxy we have collected the following monthly data from the Clarksons' 
database: 
- Newbuilding prices for the Panamax bulk carrier class 
- Second-hand prices for 5 year old Panamax 76K bulk carriers 
- Number of deliveries for Panamax bulk carrier newbuildings 
- Number of Panamax bulk carrier sales in the second-hand market.  
Assumptions 
Since the life expectancy of a ship is generally between 20-25 years, one can argue that the 
second-hand prices for 10 year old ships would be most representative for our proxy. 
However, the fleet modernization we have seen in the past decade, partially driven by the 
increasing focus on fuel efficiency, creates a skew towards the use of 5 year old second-hand 
prices. Thus, we have decided to use the 5 year old second-hand prices for our analysis.  
When considering the number of deliveries against the newbuilding prices, it is important to 
be aware that it typically takes between 2-3 years, from a ship is ordered, until it is delivered. 
This time lag thus creates a skew when calculating the monthly financing need for 
newbuildings. Arguably this could be corrected for by adjusting the newbuilding prices for 
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the time lag; however, since our period of analysis goes from 2005-2012, we do not have the 
complete data for deliveries 2-3 years into the future.  
Calculation 
To create the proxy for total financing needs, we first calculated the financing needs for the 
newbuilding and second-hand market. For the newbuilding market, this was done by 
multiplying the newbuilding prices by the number of deliveries in the respective month.  
Similarly, the financing needs for the second-hand market, was calculated by multiplying the 
number of second-hand ships sold by the second-hand prices. Adding these two together, we 
get a total proxy of the total monthly financing demand for the Panamax class.  
From this proxy, we were able to create a combined estimate of the average ship prices for 
the newbuilding and second-market. This was done by dividing the total financing proxy by 
the total number of ships delivered and sold. The result can be seen later, in the results 
section in Figure 8. 
9.7 Criticism of the dataset 
 In order of keeping our integrity and avoid any misguidance, we wish to point out some 
weaknesses in our data. 
9.7.1 Credibility of our data providers 
Public Capital Markets 
First of all, as we have already touched upon, the data collected on Bonds, IPOs and FOs has 
been gathered by outside operators (Marine Money, Clarksons). The validity of the data is, 
hence, based on the collectors being on top of the market at all-time, detecting all deals 
going through. There are, in other words, room for human errors, and as the different 
collectors may have used different sources of information, exchange rates, etc., discrepancies 
are likely to occur. When merging the databases, we hence noticed, to some extent, 
discrepancies between the databases in terms of deal entries, date of issuance and amount. 
We further noticed that the discrepancies become larger the further back in the data set one 
goes, and one hence needs to keep this in mind when assessing the data.  
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Private Capital Market 
As for the private capital markets, we have, as mention, used data collected by Dealogic for 
analyzing the development in bank lending. Dealogic is, arguably, considered to hold the 
best database for bank loan transactions within shipping. We are, however, aware that 
several significant operators in the ship financing industry do not disclose their lending 
volumes to the database (Falck, 2013), resulting in the accuracy of the database to decline. It 
does, however, give a good indication of the movement in the funding market and it is, in the 
authors’ opinion, the best source available to perform these analyzes. As for private 
placements, Marine Money has as mentioned, collected our data. Given the private nature of 
these transactions, it is, however, unlikely that the collected data represent total volumes of 
deals performed. This is especially true for the shipping industry, where we know private 
equity firms have made significant investments in the years following the crisis (Falck, 
2013).  
The fact that it is likely that transactions both for equity and debt are missing, furthermore, 
leads us to expect that the total financing level observed in our sample is below the actual 
industry level. 
9.7.2 Conversion from Marine Money’s Maritime database into a 
shipping database 
As we have in this paper forged our own shipping database, by manually excluding non-
shipping firms, there is a chance that some firms may have been wrongly included/excluded 
from the dataset. Furthermore, since some of the deals conducted have been made by large 
conglomerate firms with limited description of their transactions; we have used our best 
judgment when assessing the categorization of these companies. The deals conducted by 
these firms are typically quite large and it has therefore also been hard to determine whether 
the money raised will be used for investment in ships or other non-shipping activities. It is 
therefore important to keep this in mind as such mistakes could skew the results.  However, 
it should also be stated that these firms make up a small percentage of total firms. 
9.7.3 Nationality of the Financial Institutions 
When categorizing the different financial transactions after nationality, the nationality has 
been based on the headquarters of the institutions. This could cause some discrepancies as 
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these firms may have offices in different parts of the world, and the deal may hence not have 
been executed form the headquarters. 
9.7.4 Statistical Concerns 
In examining the statistical test, our biggest concern is the skewed number of observations. 
We have cut our start of data sample from 2003 to 2005, given the questionable validity of 
the data prior to 2005. This has caused the period prior to the crisis to be shorter (3.5 years) 
than the period after the start of the crisis (4.5 years). As the more recent data furthermore 
seems to be more accurate, and the numbers post-crisis usually heavily outweighs the 
number of entries pre, this may affect the validity of some of our statistical tests. 
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10. Hypotheses 
When deciding on a topic for our thesis, we decided to combine our interest for shipping and 
finance. Our final choice of topic was sparked by the many news articles and constant 
complaining in the media of the challenging capital conditions shipowners faced in the 
aftermath of the Lehman Brother crash. We hence wish to put these claims to the test and 
examine the change in the financial environment shipping firms have faced the last 8 years. 
We have therefore come up with several hypotheses, which we wish to look further into.  
We have in this paper divided the different types of funding up into: M&A, Bank Loans, 
Bonds (Certified Bonds +Convertible Bonds), Public Equity Offerings (IPOs+ FOs) and 
Private Placements. 
10.1 Amount per issue/ number of deals  
For each asset class defined we have tested whether there has been a substantial change from 
the pre-crisis period to post-crisis period on the: 
- The amount raised per issue 
- The number of issues raised 
Our premise for testing these variables is that the product of multiplying the two variables 
gives us the total volume of that asset class. We can by examining the different variables 
multiplying up to the product, hence define the cause of any potential changes.  
Our hypotheses are that we believe both the amount raised per issue and the number of deals 
have on average decreased post the crisis for bank loans, private placements and public 
equity offerings, while we expect to see an increase in number of bond deals. The 
development of bonds and M&A deal sizes, in addition to that of M&A activity are, 
however, more unsure variables. Our predications landed on a decline in deal size and 
number for M&A deals, while we expect an increase in bond deal sizes. 
Our basis for such hypotheses is that after the financial turmoil caused by the crash of 2008, 
the financial picture changed. With most banks severely affected by the crisis, and some 
having already gone through restructuring, it is likely that the number of bank loans issued 
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and the average deal size have decreased. Such predictions are based on the fact that banks 
are clearly more risk averse after the crisis (Von Hagen, Schuknecht, Wolswijk, 2011). They 
are less willing to take on additional risk and interested in reducing their risk per loan issued. 
This view is also in line with DNB’s future projections for the banking sector (DNB, 2012). 
As for public equity offerings, they are, as described earlier, more common in booming 
periods than troughs. This is the case as management only wishes to sell shares when the 
price reflects or overvalues the underlying assets. Given the booming pre period, a fall in 
both amount and numbers of issues were hence expected in the post period.  
Private placements are likely to behave in a similar manner as public equity offerings. After 
a pre period of highly cooperative investors, private placement have likely struggled to 
convince its investors to invest in the post period with investors being more risk averse and 
more vary of their investments. As private equity (PE) does, however, go under this 
category, and there has been a significant increase in PE investment in shipping, this could 
pull up our results. Given the private nature of these transactions, we do, nevertheless, not 
expect to see a drastic increase in PP activity.   
With a decline in both equity offerings and bank lending, shipowners need to finance 
through alternative sources. We believe bonds have overtaken the majority of the financing 
gap. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that investors have historically turned to the 
bond market in times when the capital market has contracted, and the shipowners have in the 
recent crisis had few other options to turn to. Such a switch in financing would hence 
involve an increase in number of bonds issued. When it comes to our projections of bond 
deal sizes, there are factors dragging in different directions. At one side, if bonds are going 
to replace the funding gap left by loans and equity, one would expect an increase in bond 
sizes, as the funding gap likely is quite severe. On the other side, with freight rates declining 
steeply in the later years, one would expect the fleet market value to have declined, hence 
lightening the financing needed to undertake new investments. The macroeconomic events 
leading to these conclusions are discussed in more detail under the “Macroeconomic Events” 
section for bonds. 
Given the discussed fall of shipping market values, a decrease of amount per M&A deal are 
also to be expected. In regards to numbers of deals, there are also here forces dragging in 
different directions. At one side, consolidation is fairly normal in poor economic times given 
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the companies’ wish to maximize economy of scale. Low market values could also lead to an 
increase in acquisitions, as increasing ones market share could be done a low cost. On the 
other side, it is hard to finance such deals in the current situation of the capital market. With 
many operators struggling enough as it is with their own operation; they are unlikely to take 
on more capital draining fleet capacity.  
10.2 Size of consortium 
Given the banks seeking to mitigate risk in the post period, we further wish to examine the 
change of consortium sizes from the two periods. Our hypothesis is that we have seen a 
significant increase in the syndicate sizes. In this test we only consider bank loans, as 
consortium sizes for equity and public debt offerings are of little relevance in terms of risk of 
the issuer.  
We chose to include this hypothesis after reading DNB’s presentation “Navigating through 
turbulent times” (DNB, 2012). In this presentation, DNB predicted a decline in syndicate 
sizes. Their reasoning was that banks would seek a more simplistic lending relationship, 
trending towards a larger degree of bilateral deals. There are, however, counterarguments of 
a risk and capital exposure reduction following an increase of consortium members, we wish 
to put this argument to the test. 
10.3 Proportions 
Given the reasoning of section 10.1, with a booming pre period, indicating an increase in 
bank loans and equity, and a trough of a post period, indicating a fall in bank loans and 
equity, with bonds filling much of this gap, our hypothesis for the sample is that there has 
been a change of proportions. We expect to see a similar change in proportions as with 
issuing activity, hence a significant shift from bank loans and equity towards bond financing. 
10.4 Bond interest rate and tenor 
Given the newfound importance of bonds, we wish to further examine this asset class in 
more detail. Our hypotheses are that there has been a significant increase in bond interest 
rate and a similar significant decline of the average tenor of bonds. This view is based on the 
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theory that as the market steps into a time of greater uncertainty were the solvency of the 
borrowers is questioned; the interest rate demanded is likely to increase. In such markets, 
lenders are also typically reluctant to offer lending too far into the future in fear of 
bankruptcy risk. From the borrower’s perspective, one wishes, at one hand, to have a longer 
tenor in order to reduce refinancing risk, and secure liquidity for the future. On the other 
hand, one should, however, be careful not to be bound for too long at unfavourable market 
conditions (Bodie, Kane, Marcus, 2011). As these are times were the lenders have much 
power, but also hold much risk, we expected that we would experience an increase in interest 
rate and a drop of the average tenor.  
10.5 Location of debt funding 
With the funding sources changing drastically from the pre to post period, we believe given 
the shift in market proportions that the origin of the capital also has changed. We wish to 
focus this test on the debt market, as this is the key source of ship funding. Our predictions 
are that Asian and Scandinavian financial institutions have increased their market share of 
loans issued in the second period, whereas the North American, European and Middle 
Eastern financial institutions have accounted for a smaller portion of bank loans issuances in 
the post period.  
Like in section 10.1, it is harder to predict shifts of corporate bonds issuances than that of 
bank loans. This being the case as the reasoning behind the frequency of an institution’s 
bond issuances is more complex than just examining the financial situation of this 
institution. Corporate bond issuing activity is rather to a large extent based upon the demand 
for capital by shipping companies and investors’ willingness to invest. Our predictions for 
the time period are a significant increase in the Scandinavian and Asian activity, a significant 
decrease in the North American activity, while we saw little reason for any change in 
European issuances. For total debt issuances, we believe there has been less equity financing 
in the aftermath of the crisis. Our hypothesis is hence that we expect to see an increase in 
debt levels for all regions. 
Our basis for doing this test has been that we believe there have been shifts in sources of 
financing on the global scale. Since 2005, Asia has experienced an almost continuous 
growth, whereas the Euro-zone and the United States has been hit by one of the worst 
economic crisis of all times. Based on this information, one would expect Asian financial 
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institutions to be in a better financial state in the post period, compared to institutions from 
troubled areas such as North America and Europe. One could hence assume that Asian 
financial institutions have issued more loans than those of North America and Europe in 
aftermath of the Lehman Brother crash. Markets located in areas that have been fairly 
untouched by the surrounding issues, such as Scandinavia and in particular Norway, a large 
global ship financier, would also be likely to carry a larger share of ship financing in the post 
period.  
For bonds, we have in our macroeconomic section, discussed the key economic events 
causing us to predict that there will be a proportional increase in bond issuance. Separating 
the issuance activity for the various regions, we have based our hypotheses on our perception 
on the differences of the demand and supply side of corporate bonds, and to some extent 
media coverage that has indicated a particular trend, which we then have wished to examine 
the validity of.  
Our hypothesis for Scandinavia is based on the increasing media coverage concerning the 
numerous maritime bond issuances performed here. The recent upswing in the Norwegian 
bond market has also been one of the major areas of interest for the authors, hence 
something we wish to put to the test. Our prediction of an increase in the Asian market is 
based on the growth that Asia has experienced. Even though the corporate bond and stock 
markets in Asia differ widely in size and level of development, they have been growing at a 
significant pace the later years, increasing their activity (Gyntelberg, Ma, Remolona 2005). 
Furthermore on the supply side, with Asia starting to take an increasing larger part in 
shipping, especially within shipbuilding, many of these operators are likely to turn to the 
corporate bond market for funding. While on the demand side, enormous cash reserves have 
been building up during the boom, and with investors seeking investments to place their 
money; corporate bonds should be an attractive investment in the search for yield (Frangos, 
2013). 
Considering the movement in North America, we expect a decrease in the North American 
proportion of bond activity. We believe this is the case based on the fact that United States is 
the origin of high-yield bond (Grammenos, Papapostolou, 2012), and also the key area of 
issuance in the pre period (Lloyd's List, 2010). With a significant increase in issuances from 
Scandinavia, parts of this market share is likely to have come from the United States, 
especially given the low market confidence present in the American market in the post 
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period. Furthermore, given the findings of Von Hagen, Schuknecht, and Wolswijk (2011) 
that investors penalize structural imbalance more post the Lehman crash. One could claim 
that such change in behaviour could cause investors’ willingness to invest in North America 
to decrease in the start of the financial crisis, as the structural imbalance was quite severe at 
this point of time and comparatively larger than in other markets.  
Other factors to consider could also be that institutional investors in America have to a large 
extent been sitting on the fence with large cash reserves after the crisis hit (Moody's, 2013). 
They have had little confidence in the market and the governing body, a notion being 
enforced even more with the recent indecisiveness in regards to the failure of dealing with 
the mounting American debt. Such extraction could cause the demand for bonds to shrink 
considerably, taking away much buying power.  
 
Figure 7: Net issuance of long-term non-financial corporate debt securities 
in Europe 
In terms of Europe, we see no reason for any significant change in the activity level. Our 
hypothesis is to a large extent based on Deutsche Bank’s research paper on the overall 
European corporate bond movement (Deutsche Bank, 2013). Looking at Figure 7, we see 
that by comparing the peaks and troughs, the market more or less equals out in the post 
period, with perhaps a small overall increase. The fundamental drivers behind these swings 
have mostly been the macroeconomic factors already discussed. However, the main driver 
for the high issuance volumes seems to be investors’ search for yield in a low interest rate 
environment. As sovereign bonds are offering historically low yields, corporate bonds have 
become increasingly interesting investment (Deutsche Bank 2013). We see little reason why 
shipping bonds issuances should separate itself substantially from the overall movement, and 
hence expect to see a small but insignificant increase. 
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Lastly for total debt issuances, we believe there has been less equity financing in the 
aftermath of the crisis. Our reasoning for such hypothesis is the same as in section 1.1, 
namely that it is not common to issue equity in a period of low market values. Both Pecking 
and market timing theory further support such statement. Furthermore, we also believe the 
magnitude of bank loans will supersede the potential negative effect of bonds, leading to an 
increase in debt in Asia and Scandinavia and a decrease of debt in Europe and North 
America. 
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11. Macroeconomic Development 
In this section we will discuss the main macroeconomic events that led up to and occurred 
during the sample period. We have separated this section from the rest of the analysis, as 
many of these happenings have to a large extent dictated the development of the asset classes 
examined. The analysis would hence be very repetitive if these events were discussed in 
detail under each subsection.  
In the start of the 21
st
 century, world trade experienced typically boom and bust cycles. The 
world economy experienced a financial crisis in 1997-99, both in Asia and Russia. The trade 
then surprisingly recovered and boomed again by the spring of 2000, before the collapse of 
internet stocks in early 2001 triggered a deep recession in the Atlantic and Asian economies, 
also known as the Dotcom crisis (Stopford 2009). As shipping freights are strongly 
correlated with global trade activity, freight rates varied greatly in the start of the millennium 
before crashing in 2002. By the end of 2003, freight rates had, however, yet again started to 
pick up speed (ClarkSea Index) and the shipyards’ orderbook had already started to build up 
because of the emerging Chinese economy. Their industry was mostly export oriented, and 
the country now entered into a period of considerable infrastructure development. This 
development was dependent upon the import of enormous quantities of raw materials, such 
as coal and iron. A booming China, in other words, meant a steep increase in demand for the 
seaborne trade, creating an acute shortage of ships, resulting in dry bulk and tanker rates 
propelling to new heights (Stopford, 2009). As the freight rates increased, a huge demand for 
financing followed. The banks were, however, reluctant to overextend their lending prior to 
reassuring themselves that the market was going to recover fully. As the sustainability of the 
growth became increasingly clear by the end of 2003/start of 2004, shipping loans issuances 
surged by 2005.  
Between 2003/4 and 2008, the shipping market actually experienced one of the largest 
booms of all times, having freight rates reaching astronomically high levels, only 
comparable to the rates reached during World War I (Stopford, 2013). This led shipping 
firms to continue to looks for ways to expand their fleet in these prospering market 
conditions, this happening either trough newbuildings or expensive acquirements of second-
hand ships. Such investments required additional funding, leading to a rise not only in bank 
loans, but in both equity and debt issuance. As the peak grew bigger, so did the demand for 
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capital, finally resulting in the supply of ships far outweigh the demand when seaborne trade 
started to decline.  
Considering the second part of our sample period, the world economy gradually went into a 
deep recession, with the crisis arguably hitting its peak with the crash of Lehmann Brothers 
in mid-September 2008. We will not discuss the crisis or its underlying factors in detail, as 
our main focus here is the effect the collapse had on the shipping industry and world trade in 
general. A bankruptcy of such a large operator like Lehman Brothers did, however, cause 
turmoil in the financial market, awakening counterparty credit concerns, as well as heavily 
affecting other financial operators. With the bailout of AIG following the next day, 
counterparty credit concerns increased even more (Baba, Packer, 2009). These were just 
some of the more renowned firms that were struggling, and with most of these operators 
previously being top ranked by the credit rating companies. The trust/credibility in the 
market disappeared causing short-term funding costs to spike. Solvency now became the 
area of focus. Without knowing whom to trust, the liquidity of the debt market quickly dried 
up (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, Tehranian, 2011). With many banks relying heavily on short 
term funding in the interbank market (Ivashina, Scharfstein 2010), the effect of the spike in 
short-term funding costs was further strengthened causing many banks to struggle to roll 
over their short term debt, leading much of lending to dry up by 2009. The decline in loan 
issuances was, however, not as steep as that of publicly traded securities. The much steeper 
decline in traded commercial paper may reflect an overall lack of trust in securitized debt 
after the financial market crashed, regardless of the fact that a commercial paper is a direct 
obligation of the borrower (Asmundson, Dorsey, Khachatryan, Niculcea, Saito 2011). 
 In terms of shipping, freight rates plunged by late 2008 as the global trade experiencing a 
sharp drop. The drop in global trade can, however, not completely be credited to the crash in 
the financial market, as, among other things, a sharp increase in food and fuel prices had 
unsettled world trade the previous year (Asmundson, Dorsey, Khachatryan, Niculcea, Saito 
2011). With the freights rate at a low, many shipping firms were losing money, with 
operating costs exceeding freight rates, even with slow steaming. Worst positioned were the 
shipowners who had overextended themselves and were expecting delivery of newbuilding 
vessels, but had not yet secure financing.  As the crisis prolonged, the need for capital 
became greater. Shipowners now had to meet their financing needs at a higher cost of 
capital. Most exposed were those who were highly geared and had gambled by operating 
 69 
larger parts of their fleet in the spot market and therefore were not able to maintain the high 
interest rate repayments.   
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Figure 8: Panamax Total Financing Need 
          Source: Clarksons 
As the freight rates came out of the worst trough by the end of 2009 (Clarksea Index), 
optimism was again to be found in the market. Many expected the market to fully recover 
and a new round of ordering started. This optimism is illustrated in Figure 8 showing 
Panamax contracting numbers, with the total financing needed on the left vertical axis, and 
average vessel price in millions US dollars on the right vertical axis. Strong countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies in most developed and emerging-market economies helped the 
global economy turn the corner in mid-2009. Robust demand for commodities from the 
rapidly growing emerging-market economies, and a stronger recovery than expected in 
domestic demand in the US indications of better times to come (Trade and Development 
Report, 2010). This growth followed into 2010 with a worldwide GDP growth of 3.9pp, 
much of this fueled by the leading developing countries (China, India, Brazil)(Trade and 
Development Report, 2011). This improved the financial market conditions in the first half 
of 2010, and many decided to access the debt and to some extent equity market in order to 
refinance/restructure/invest. Such optimism can again be spotted in Figure 8, with Panamax 
contracting numbers peaking in mid-2010. 
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As the effect of the stimulus packages started to diminish, with governments introducing a 
shift towards fiscal consolidation, growth slowed down in the second half of 2010, a trend 
that followed into 2011 where the global economy lost steam (Trade and Development 
Report, 2012). By this time, the magnitude of the European sovereign debt crisis was 
becoming increasingly clear and can to some extent explain the decline of growth. The 
stimulus packages, on top of already significant debt levels, had led many countries in the 
Euro-zone to build up unsustainable levels of debt in the years following the market crash of 
2008. This rise in debt levels had caused a wave of downgrades of government debt, which 
resulted in several countries’ solvency being questioned. The countries worst affected were 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, often referred to as the PIGS countries. With the 
numerous downgrades and the uncertainty gradually increasing from the end of 2009, the 
term spread of the respective governments bonds rose steeply, making refinancing of current 
debt close to impossible in the long run. In order to avoid a collapse of these countries and 
ultimately the Euro-zone, the European Central Bank (ECB) followed through on a series of 
measurements, among other things a bond purchase plan in order to secure sustainable short 
term financing. Regardless of ECB’s actions, uncertainty in the market remained high, 
causing the market confidence to tumble and ultimately dragged parts of the world economy 
back into a recession again (Lane, 2012).  
In addition to the emergence of the European sovereign debt crisis, with Greece and 
Portugal’s term spread spiking from the second half of 2010 to the start of 2012, global 
financial risks, as well as, political and social unrest in North Africa and Western Asia have 
also affected world trade negatively in 2010/11(Trade and Development Report, 2012). As 
the market turned, investors realized that much of the growth in the previous years had been 
brought forward by the stimulus packages, while little had been done to fix the underlying 
problems. This caused the optimism to fall and liquidity in the capital market disappeared 
again. By introducing the stimulus packages, the governments had in fact enforced the 
already emerging sovereign debt crisis, bringing the Euro-zone even deeper into troubled 
waters. 
With market confidence again at a low, the banks’ patience had now been strained, 
suggesting a change in the financial market, where the usual flexibility of the banks now was 
gone. After years of being understanding, accepting heavy short-term losses, many banks 
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can no longer wait for their customers to recover, causing them to pull the plug on some of 
the worst affected firms. Notorious private equity legend Wilburn Ross phrases this change 
of attitude pretty clearly. “What’s happening this time is the lending banks are really starting 
to pull triggers. Whereas in older times, they would try to play along with the owners, now 
they’re being much more prompt and saying “Enough is enough, we need to pull out”” 
(LaRocco, 2012).   
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12. Results 
In this chapter we will discuss and analyze the results from our hypothesis testing.  
12.1 Capital Structure Theory 
We will in this section relate the financing theories discussed in chapter 3, to the data we 
have collected, in order to see if there is evidence to support these theories.  
12.1.1 Trade-off theory 
We find little support for the trade-off theory in the shipping industry as a whole, as this 
theory suggest that firms should be financed with enough debt to capture the debt tax shield 
(DTS) so that the benefit of the DTS is only marginally higher than the associated costs of 
financial distress that arise with high debt ratios. The taxation of shipping firms is especially 
lenient as previously discussed in section 2.4, thereby eliminating the lucrative DTS created 
by the use of debt. According to the theory, this should leave the shipping firms with only 
the costs of financial distress, thereby discouraging them from using debt. Despite this, our 
data shows that debt has made up approximately 70- 80% of the total financing for the 
period analyzed. We therefore conclude that the trade-off theory is not applicable to explain 
the pattern of financing for the shipping industry. 
12.1.2 Pecking Order theory and Market Timing Theory 
 The pecking order theory, describes the preferred order of how a firm finances its new 
investments. If we look at the ClarkSea Index in Figure 9, which shows the weekly earnings 
for main commercial vessel types, weighted according to the number of vessels in each fleet 
sector, we see that earnings drastically improved during the shipping boom from 2003-2008. 
This boom made it easy for shipping firms to attain credit from banks for new investments. 
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Figure 9: ClarkSea Index 
         Source: Clarksons 
Our numbers show that the use of equity both in the form of public equity and private 
placements in the pre-crisis period, made up an average of 26.3%, while only 14.7% in the 
post-crisis period. This implies a rise in the use of debt after the financial crisis, which is 
contrary to the pecking order theory. According to the theory, equity will be issued last, 
when all other options have been exhausted. One would therefore expect that shipping firms 
would have utilized more debt relative to equity during the pre-period, as credit was easily 
attainable. In the post period, we know banks cut back on credit, leading to increased use of 
the bond market for financing. The use of FOs peaked in the crisis year of 2009, possibly 
suggesting that firms who could not attain financing from banks or the bond market were 
forced to use equity instead, which is also the last resort according to the pecking order 
theory. Despite this, the evidence is too weak to suggest that the pecking order theory can 
explain the financing choices of the shipping firms due to considerable use of equity in the 
pre period.  
The market timing theory seems to be the theory that best fits the observed behaviour of 
shipping firms. To quickly recap, the market timing theory implies that the firm does not 
choose between equity or debt, but rather tries to find the source of capital that is most 
beneficial to the firm. It is, however, important to remember that the financial crisis created 
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havoc, thus limiting the supply of financing sources available. This could therefore affect the 
choice of funding and give a bias towards debt financing, as we will discuss further in the 
debt section. 
In our dataset, we see an increased number of IPOs leading up to the crisis, suggesting that 
shipping firms used the financing option that was most beneficial for the firm. The pre 
period was characterized by high earnings and great market sentiment both in shipping and 
the rest of the financial markets. This upswing created a viable market for IPOs, which the 
PWC's Global IPO Report (2012) confirms. The post period was characterized by bleak 
market sentiment, forcing shipping firms to utilize the bond market, private equity and FOs 
as the credit from banks dried up. Grammenos and Papapostolou (2012) also find support for 
this in their paper, describing the shift from pecking order theory for the period of 80s and 
90s, towards the market timing theory for the last decade.  
12.2 Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) 
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Figure 10:M&A Trend 
When studying the development of M&A transactions in Figure 10, it is important to have in 
mind that the number of deals in the chart contains all the deals executed in the period, even 
those listed with zero value in the database. The reason for zero values could be that details 
of the deal have not been made public, thereby listing it as zero. The total amount is 
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therefore not as interesting as before. Thus one cannot look at the graph and say that the 
average M&A deal has decline in the post period.  
 In our test we have excluded the zero values for comparing the average amount; however, 
on the overall number of M&A deals we have included the deals with zero value.  
Table 1: M&A Results 
Pre Post
Mean deal size* 465.802 329.359
Observations 184 49
T-value 1.005
Critical T-value 1.666
P-value 0.159
Mean number of deals 61.75 16.20
Observations 247 81
T-value 28.434
Critical Value 1.657
P-value 5.73E-57
*Deals with 0 value are  not included
M&A
Number of deals t-test
Amount per deal t-test
 
Results 
From the results, we can see that there has been a significant drop in the number of deals 
executed in the post period. Declining from an average of 61.75 in the pre period to only 
16.2 in the post period. This is in line with our hypothesis, as well as, with the DVB report 
(2012), where they find that M&A activity has significantly dropped in the aftermath of the 
crisis. The results furthermore showed no significant drop in average deal size between the 
two periods. This is opposite to our initial hypothesis, and hence needs further analyzing. 
Looking at the average deal size, we see that the drop is quite severe, decreasing from 
$465.8 to $329 million. One would hence think that this would be statistical significant. Due 
to the many outliers of the sample, we, however, suspect that these outliers might affect the 
result. We hence believe that the deal size has gone significantly down. We are, nevertheless, 
unable to prove this statistically. Such decrease would also be in line with the drop in vessel 
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value. Thus, the fall in the deal size could partly be accredited to the lower implied valuation 
of ships and shipping firms.  
Another important point, and probably the most prominent reason, is the contraction of the 
funding market. In addition to this, in these harsh market conditions, most shipping firms 
will have enough with just staying "afloat" themselves, thus having no desire to expose 
themselves towards the extra risk. The DVB Bank report (2012) predicts the shipping M&A 
activity in 2013 and onwards will be driven by the aim to reduce costs, maintain market 
positions and negotiation powers. They also note that the volatility of the equity and debt 
markets will continue to make it hard to secure funding for deals. However, there is a large 
amount of money on the sideline, waiting to be placed by both strategic and financial 
investors. Globally, general M&A activity has been suppressed by the slow recovery of the 
world economy. The 2012 global M&A activity represents a 41 % fall from the pre-crisis 
level according to Clifford Chance (2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
12.3 Equity 
The premise for the increase of IPOs and FOs came mainly after the down turn of the 
Dotcom crisis from the good investment sentiment from the period between 2004 and 2007. 
In addition, the shipping market was experiencing a boom, needing to fund the expansion of 
the fleet as the growth of the Chinese economy drove the demand for seaborne trade 
(Grammenos, Papostolou, 2012) (Merikas et al. (2009).  
12.3.1 Public Equity Market Offerings 
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Figure 11: Initial Public Offerings Trend 
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Figure 12: Follow-On Offerings Trend 
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Figure 11 and 12 illustrate the use of IPOs and FOs for our period of analysis. The left axis 
shows the total amount raised, while the right axis shows the number of deals.  
Together with an upbeat stock market and tremendously high freight rates, equity as a 
financing source peaked in 2007 with $20.429 billion raised, making up an astonishing 38% 
of the total financing that year. Looking at IPO activity alone, we see that it peaked in 2005 
and 2007, while seeing a dip in 2006. Interestingly, number of transactions actually 
increased from 2005 to 2006, possibly suggesting the listing of smaller firms. With the 
increasing IPO activity, FO activity also flourished, having an almost linear growth from 
2005 until 2009, with the only exception coming in 2008, where there was a drop in both 
amount and numbers of deals. 
As the financial crisis hit in the fall of 2008, and both the stock market and freight rates 
collapsed, there was a major dip in the use of equity. With the stock market bottoming out 
and starting its slow recovery in early 2009, the usage of FOs peaked the same year. 
However, after the peak in 2009, we see a steady decline in FOs. The number of deals has 
though remained surprisingly high. IPOs have, on the contrary, seen a steady decrease in the 
post period, only seeing a spike in activity in 2009, before continuing to fall the following 
years. 
Results 
After having initially described the trend picture in public equity financing, we will now use 
the statistical tests described in chapter 8 to test our hypotheses. The standard deviations for 
the two periods, for both IPOs and FOs, are larger than their averages, thus implying that 
there is a large spread in the deal sizes. Thus, we have also conducted a Wilcoxon/Mann 
Whitney U test on our amount samples. However, due to the nature of the test and the results 
it provided, we find its usage questionable. We have therefore chosen to omit it from the 
following analysis section and provided the output in appendix 8 for reference purpose. 
IPOs 
Beginning with IPOs, the average amount raised for the pre period was $299 million, while 
in the post period; the average amount had declined to $148 million. This is a staggering 
drop of 50.5% in average deal size. Looking at the issuance activity, we see a decrease in 
IPOs, from an average of 31.25 in the pre period to only 9 in the post period. In line with 
these drops, the proportion of IPOs relative to total financing, dropped from an average of 
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15.3% in the pre period, to only 2.53% in the post period. All the results can be found in 
Table 2 and are statistically strongly significant, due to their p-value being less than 0.05.  
Table 2: IPO Results 
Pre Post
Mean deal size* 299.010 148.048
Observations 103 32
T-value 3.6126
Critical T-value 1.6565
P-value 0.0002
Mean number of deals 31.250 9.000
Observations 125 45
T-value 12.561
Critical Value 1.670
P-value 0.000
p̂ (proportion 0.153 0.025
Total observed deals 660 641
Z-value 7.978
Critical Z-value 1.645
P-value 0.00E+00
*Deals with 0 value are not included
Amount per deal t-test
Number of deals t-test
Proportion z-test
IPO
 
Further exploring our data, looking at annual figures, we see that the largest listings came in 
2007 and 2008, with an average issuance size of $379 and $471 million, respectively. As one 
might expect, all the issues of 2008, came prior to the fall of Lehman Brothers in September. 
The year 2009, was an extreme year with only two issues, amounting to an average of $67.1 
million. Number of issues and average deal size again picked up in 2010, reaching 17 issues 
and $166 million, respectively. Despite this initial recovery, the average deal size has fallen 
to just $102 million with only 5 issues in 2012. This analysis backs up the statistical results 
we previously mentioned.  
FOs 
For FOs, the average amount raised per deal dropped by 17.2%, from $195.5 to $161.9 
million in the post period. To our surprise, the average number of deals actually increased in 
the post period, from 23 to 23.8. FOs as a proportion of total financing, also surprised us, 
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actually increased from 8.7 % to 10% in the post period. The test results are presented in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: FO Results 
Pre Post
Mean deal size* 195.515 161.88
Observations 90 116
T-value 0.856
Critical T-value 1.654
P-value 0.197
Mean number of deals 23.000 23.800
Observations 92 119
T-value -0.497
Critical Value 1.659
P-value 0.310
p̂ (proportion) 0.087 0.100
Total observed deals 660 641
Z-value -0.808
Critical Z-value -1.645
P-value 0.210
*Deals with 0 value are  not included
Follow-Ons
Amount per deal t-test
Number of deals t-test
Proportion z-test
 
 
While the decrease in amount was expected, we were a bit puzzled by the actual increase in 
number of deals and the increase in proportion of total financing. However, looking at the p-
values, we see that they are not even significant at a confidence level of 90%. Thus, from a 
statistical standpoint, it suggests that the usage of FOs has not significantly changed, rather 
remained stable and served as a funding source for shipping firms, despite the financial 
turmoil. 
Analyzing the average yearly deal sizes, we see a slightly different pattern, than for IPOs. 
For FOs the peaks came in 2008 and 2009, with on average $239 and $249 million raised 
respectively. After this, the average FO dropped drastically in size, falling to $98 and $93 
million in 2011-2012 period. Looking at the yearly proportions, we see that FOs peak as a 
means of financing in 2009, making up 27.2%. This makes it the second largest source of 
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capital that year, only beaten by bank loans, which made up 56.7%. Despite the peak in 
2009, the importance of FOs drastically fell the following years, only making up between 7-
8% of total financing. 
Looking at the overall equity results from our analysis, we find that they are partially in line 
with our hypothesis. As equity markets bottomed out in early 2009, and started their slow 
recovery, the shipping market, as previously mentioned, kept struggling. With no immediate 
relief in sight and shipping firms striving to survive, one would not expect investors to be 
very willing to sink their funds into an industry in turmoil. This is evident from the results 
we found in IPOs, where the issuance, deal size and volume have drastically dropped in the 
post period. With low freight rates and vessel prices, as discussed earlier, an IPO would 
likely drastically undervalue the shipping firm. Other types of financing, like bonds would 
therefore be more beneficial. In addition, the IPO market in general has been struggling to 
recover from its fall in 2008/2009, suggesting that the low issuance of IPOs in the shipping 
segment is also related to the general market turmoil created by the European sovereign debt 
crisis and weak economic outlooks for the world (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
When we look at FOs we see a different pattern than what we hypothesized. Our results 
suggest that once a company has been listed, it is willing to tap the equity markets for 
additional funds, despite financial turmoil. The willingness of investors also seems to be 
there despite the collapse of the financial markets. According to Grammenos and 
Papapostolou (2012), the primary use of FOs in the US market, during 2008/09, were to 
repay existing debt. In regards to our results for FOs, it is important to remember that the 
financial crisis has severally limited the lending and risk appetite of banks, which has been 
the traditional source of finance, thereby forcing companies either to utilize the public 
markets, either in form of bonds or equity. Possibly, companies that could not obtain bonds 
due to their financial situation would be forced to utilize FOs as a last resort. Investors 
having a substantial share in shipping firms, possibly facing bankruptcy, would hence have 
to "bail out" their own company opposed to possibly losing everything in a bankruptcy, and 
thus possibly risk missing out, once the shipping market rebounds.  
After having reviewed our results for the two individual funding sources that make up the 
public equity issuance, we observe that both IPOs and FOs grew steeply during the booming 
years, causing total public equity issuance to surge. After the crisis, IPO volumes, deal size 
and activity have plunged, while FO activity initially grew before slightly declining. The 
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surprisingly high issuance level of FOs do, however, not make up for the significant decrease 
of IPOs. On average, equity made up 26% of the total financing from the period of 2005-
2009, before drastically falling to an average of only 12% from 2010-2012. 
12.3.2 Private Placement  
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Figure 13: Private Placement Trend 
Private placement makes up a very small percentage of the total financing in our sample, 
only amounting for about 2.6 % of the total capital raised. If we look at the equity portion 
only, PP makes up on average 13.84 % for the entire period of analysis. On average $1.175 
billion was raised per year in the pre period, while only $1 billion in the post period. The 
above graph shows the development of the private placements through the period we have 
analyzed. As one can see from the graph the total amount in the pre period remained stable, 
peaking in 2006 with $1.6038 billion raised in 22 deals. In the post period where the 
financial crisis wrecked havoc, we see a large dip in 2009 with only $6 million raised in 1 
deal, before PP again picked up.  
In our hypothesis, we stated that we believed that private placements would behave the same 
way as the public equity markets and decline when the financial crisis hit. However, looking 
at the results we see a slightly different picture. 
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Table 4: Private Placement Results 
Pre Post
Mean deal size* 111.985 190.341
Observations 42 21
T-value -1.546
Critical T-value 1.711
P-value 0.068
Mean number of deals 11.00 4.40
Observations 44 22
T-value 4.928
Critical Value 1.690
P-value 9.98E-06
p̂ (proportion) 0.023 0.021
Total observed deals 660 641
Z-value 0.241
Critical Z-value 1.645
P-value 0.595
*Deals with 0 value are  not included
Private Placement
Amount per deal t-test
Number of deals t-test
Proportion z-test
 
For average amount raised, we predicted that there would be a decline in the post period; 
however, it has actually increased from $111.9 million to $190.3 million, which is an 
increase of 70%. Statistically, this results is not significant at a 95% confidence level, 
however, if we lower the requirement to only 90%, we see that the results is well within this 
range, with a p-value of 0.0676.  
Further analyzing the data, we see that there has been a significant drop in the average 
number of deals, falling 60%, from an average of 11 to only 4.4 in the post period. This 
result is highly significant at a confidence level of 99%, with a p-value less than 0.01. 
Looking at this result in relation to the average amount raised, it suggests that there has been 
made fewer, but larger PP in the post period. If we look at the proportion statistic, we see 
that there has not been a statistical significant change in the proportion of PPs, falling 
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slightly in the post period from 2.3% to 2.1%. Thus, it seems that the use of PP has remained 
stable in the post period. 
Comparing the results with our initial hypothesis, we can see that private placements have 
behaved differently from what we first thought. While the number of private placements fell, 
the average deal sizes actually rose, at the same time as the portion remained close to pre 
levels. This implies that the usage of PP has remained stable despite the financial crisis.  
On the other hand, given the private nature of PPs, our sample may, as mentioned, lack a 
number of entries that have not been made public. This could give a skewed picture in either 
direction. However, the most likely scenario is that we are missing transactions, thus one 
should be aware of this when interpreting the results.  
Private equity funds, which may take part in private placements, given that the firm is not 
publicly traded, have increased their investments in shipping significantly post 2009 (DVB 
Bank, 2012). The private equity funds speculate in making large profits once the shipping 
market rebounds. Given the low number of transactions observed in our data, we do hence 
assume that a large part of these deals have been held outside the public market, and hence 
not included in our sample.  
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12.4 Debt 
In this paper we have defined debt as bank loans and bonds combined. Given that bank loans 
have historically been the most important source of capital for shipping firms, we will first 
consider how this asset class has developed the last years. 
12.4.1 Bank Loans 
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Figure 14: Bank Loan Trends 
                                                                                            
The figure above illustrates the issuance of bank loans to the shipping industry over the last 8 
years. The left vertical axis represents the total amount issued annually and the right vertical 
axis, the number of transactions performed during the time period. From the transaction 
information we have attained, we see that loans volumes peaked in 2005 and have dropped 
ever since. The loan issuance has, however, not really been declining since 2005, but rather 
stabilizing after an unusual year. Looking in more detail, we observe that bank loan volumes 
and issuances have fallen from a total volume of $49 billion and 121 issuances, representing 
almost 74% of all ship financing in 2005 to a loan volume of only $19.4 billion divided upon 
41 issuances in 2009, with volumes representing just over 56.7% of total financing at this 
point. The market then made a recovery in 2010-11, reaching a volume high of $40.5 billion 
in 2010 and an issuance and proportion high in 2011 of 108 and 65.9% respectively. 
Realizing that the recovery was premature, the banks then contracted, causing the loan 
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volume to plunge again, ending up at a period low of $9.9 billion or 41.7% in 2012. The 
number of issuance also declined, but at much slower rate, ending up at 56 loans issuances in 
2012.  
Results 
Considering Figure 14 and the data presented in the previous paragraph, one can hence see 
that loan volumes have varied substantially during the period we have monitored ship 
financing. Given the information provided, it is, however, difficult to make any concrete 
conclusions on the movements of the different variables. We have therefore gone deeper into 
the data, where we have, through statistical tests, compared the pre and post period of the 
recent financial crisis. Our analysis has proven a significant decrease in both the proportion 
of bank loans and number of bank loans issued for the shipping industry, while no 
significant change was found for the amount raised per bank loan. The results can be found 
in Table 5.  
Pre Post
Mean deal size* 377.405 372.551
Observations 341 297
T-value 0.079
Critical T-value 1.648
P-value 0.468
Mean number of deals 85.75 62.40
Observations 343 312
T-value 9.464
Critical Value 1.650
P-value 0.000
p̂ (proportion) 0.639 0.592
Total observed deals 660 641
Z-value 1.751
Critical Z-value 1.645
P-value 0.040
*Deals with 0 value are  not included
Number of deals t-test
Proportion z-test
Amount per deal t-test
Bank Loans
 
Table 5: Bank Loan Results 
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Starting our analysis on the proportional finding, the test found a significant change in 
proportions even though the average decreased just less than 5 pp from the pre to post 
period. Examining the data further, we believe the reason that such a small changed turned 
significant is because of the magnitude of the number of observations and the amounts that 
are in motion here. The result also has a fairly high p-value, making it significant, but only 
with a 95% confidence level. The result does, however, confirm our hypothesis, and one can 
conclude that the bank loans have decrease significantly in importance in the post period.  
Another interesting notion to include here is that even though loan volume peaked at $40.5 
billion in the 2010-11 recovery, the proportions did not peaked before 2011. Such 
discrepancy indicates that in 2010 other asset classes made up a larger market share than 
earlier, causing the bank loan proportion to increase less proportionally than earlier. 
Examining the data, we find that in 2010 bonds indeed made a jump, increasing their 
funding share with 12.2pp to 27.9%, while FOs still represented 7.7% of total funding after 
its peak in 2009, hence leading bank loan proportions not to reach its peak of the post period 
in 2010. 
Moving on in our analysis, we see that our hypothesis regarding a fall in the number of bank 
loans issued in the post period is confirmed, with a drop of average number of loans issuance 
per year from 85.75 to 62.4. The result also has a very low p-value, making it highly 
significant with a 99% confidence level. Looking further into the annual data, we see that the 
result remains significant even though we see a strong increase in number of deals made in 
2010-2011(highest during the sample). This increase could potentially have lifted the 
average enough to alter the statistical result, but the low number of deals made in 2009 and 
2012, however, outweighed the number of issuance made during the recovery. 
Considering the statistical findings on the change of average deal size, the test found no 
significant change. This is not in line with our initial hypothesis and hence needs to be 
examined further. At first glance, this result seems natural, as the averages for the two 
periods are very close. Examining the data closer we, however, find that the trend of total 
volume and number of issuances diverge between 2010-12, where the number of issuances is 
at all times higher than that of loan volumes. Such discrepancy indicates that there was a 
significant decrease of deal size between 2010 and 2012. Analyzing the data, we find that the 
average amount per loan indeed plunged from 2010 to 2012, declining 24.8% from 2010 to 
2011 and another 45.9% from 2011 to 2012. So why has this declined not caused a 
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significant outcome in the t-test? Examining amount per deal between 2008 and 2010 gives 
us the answer. Here we see an increase in the amount per deal far beyond previous deal 
sizes, dragging up average deal size in the post period. As the larger part of 2008 is included 
in the pre period, this increases its mean, but at a much smaller scale. One can hence 
conclude that the test does not find a significant decrease in amount per deal, as the time 
period examined is inappropriate for the sample. The test should have been done comparing 
the time periods pre and post 2010. By doing so, one will see a highly significant decrease, 
with a drop of average deal size of 59% between 2010 and 2012.  It is hence correct that the 
banks recently have reduced deal size as a risk mitigation tool, but such reduction did not 
happen before in 2011. 
Following the banking industry’s trend of risk mitigation, another hypothesis of ours was 
that we also expected to see an increase in consortium sizes. Our statistical t-test confirmed 
this hypothesis, with the average consortium size increasing from 2 to 3 per deal. The results 
can be found in Table 6. Looking at the p-values, we see that the result is highly significant, 
with a confidence level of 99%. Such result indicates that the number of club deals has 
increased. The result, furthermore, partially rejects DNB’s prediction of a decline in 
consortium sizes, but as some of the transactions had very large syndicates, these outliers are 
likely to pull the average significantly up. It is hence hard to reject DNB’s argument. 
However, looking closer at the data, we observe that very few syndicate loans are being 
made in the post period. One can hence conclude that it is likely that banks have wished to 
diversify their lending portfolio by increasing the consortium sizes. An increase of club deals 
can, however, also be attributed to the lack of liquidity in the capital market, leading banks 
to come together to fulfill customer’s capital demands. Such trends have led the number of 
club deals to increase.  
t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Pre Post
Mean 2.079 3.084
Observations 331 296
T-value -5.377
Critical T-value 1.648
P-value 6.23E-08
Consortium Size
 
Table 6: Consortium Size 
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Trying to explain the bank lending trend, one should have in mind that the world economy 
had started to recover from the Dotcom crisis before 2005, and by the time we start our 
sample, shipping loans reached its peak. Starting our sample at this point of time hence gives 
an indication of a fall in financing in the following years, whereas the truth is that it was 
actually fairly easy for shipping firms to attain financing from 2005-2008.  
Explanatory variables 
Having described the key macroeconomic event behind the development of bank loans in 
our macroeconomic section, we now wish to point on a couple of key contributing factors 
leading to the drop of bank loans in the post period. 
 A key factor attributing to the drop has been the pending implementation of Basel III and 
the stricter capital requirements it will impose on banks. As mentioned in our theory section, 
with Basel III the required equity of banks have increased proportionally given the same 
amount of risk. This forces the banks to either raise more equity or reduce the risk associated 
with its lending portfolio. The later option is because the capital requirements are relative to 
the bank’s assets through the implementation of risk weighted assets (RWA). Equity 
requirement hence depends upon the assets riskiness. As banks are, for various reasons, 
reluctant to raise equity in the market, most banks have turned to their risky portfolio in 
order to reach the Basel III requirements. By removing/significantly reducing the lending to 
these groups, they can reduce required equity holdings. As shipping is a highly volatile 
industry, such efforts have particularly affected the industry. As a result, bank loans as 
means of financing have been available to fewer shipowners since the peak of 2008 and this 
is unlikely to change anytime soon. Several banks have, with the recent crash in freight rates 
in mind, severely cut their funding to the industry, with even some of the previous biggest 
lenders such as Commerzbank AG, Germany’s second largest lender, completely 
discontinuing their lending to the industry (Commerzbank, 2012).       
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Figure 15: Price Index 
Source: Clarksons 
However, the decline can also be partially explained by the fall of the vessel values, in 
addition to the numerous restructurings of both shipping companies and banks. The 
fluctuation of vessel values within shipping is often characterized as quite extreme. From 
having astronomically high price tags in times of excess demand, vessel values quickly 
depreciate when the market collapses. The reason for this is that these values are based on 
projected future earnings. Market values are hence strongly correlated with the movement of 
the freight rates, which is known to be very volatile. Banks are therefore, as mentioned, 
normally very reluctant to extend secured loans, with security in vessels, above 50% of 
current market values. This is especially the case in booming periods where these values 
typically are inflated.  
With the recent decline in freight rates, the market value of the world fleet has as expected 
decreased severely. Figure 15 illustrates the development in the second-hand and 
newbuilding price indexes the later years. As we can see, both have experienced a quite 
significant drop since 2008/ 2007, down 41pp and almost 32pp respectively from their 
peaks. Such decline in market value has hence caused the needed financing for new 
investments to drop dramatically. This decrease is further illustrated in Figure 8, showing an 
approximate of the movement in the need of financing. We see that as vessel values decline, 
so has the total funding needed. Part of the decline in bank loans can hence partially be 
explained be lower vessel prices, leading us to conclude that the excess demand for bank 
loans may not be as severe as many industry professionals have expressed. 
Lastly, with both the shipping industry and the banking sector predominantly experiencing 
rough waters since the crash of the capital markets in 2008, many of both kinds have gone 
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through heavy restructuring and refinancing. Hence, with credit committees in place, bank 
lending might be further limited, especially to industries perceived risky or where most 
operators are struggling financially. One would hence expect that shipping would be 
allocated less capital. 
Summarizing up, bank loans have experienced a significant drop in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, which can to a large degree be explained by the pending implementation of 
Basel III, lower financing need given the lower market values of vessels and stricter lending 
policies. 
12.4.2 Bonds 
When we are referring to bonds in this section, we consider both certified bonds, as well as 
convertible bonds. We decided to pool these in order to examine the total availability of 
capital from the shipping bond market. It should, however, be noted that convertible bonds 
represent a small part of the total bonds volume, and that removing convertibles would not 
change the trend pattern drastically.  
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Figure 16: Bonds Trend 
Examining the importance of bonds as means of ship financing, we see that its share has 
increased from a volume of $3.4 billion out of 19 issues in 2005, accounting for 5.1% of all 
ship financing to a share of 17.8% in 2007, accounting for just less than $10.3 billion raised 
from 35 issues. This is also the peak of the pre period both in terms of numbers of deals, 
volume and proportions. In the following year, the marked collapsed with bond volumes 
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falling 87.8% from the year before. This is also a sample low for proportions, representing 
2.8% of ship financing, with financial institutions only issuing 7 shipping bonds, amounting 
to just over $1.25 billion. The market then slowly built itself up in 2009, before really 
booming the subsequent year. By 2010, bonds represented 27.9% of vessel financing and 
ended up at an annual shipping bond volume of $19.2 billion, which is a sample high. This 
increase between 2009 and 2010 is characteristic both for number of deals performed per 
year as well as annual bond volume. From 2009 to 2010, volumes increased with 
astonishingly 260%, before dropping and stabilizing at just above pre-crisis levels the next 
two years. Number of deals has had the same noteworthy increase following the crisis, but 
did not peak before 2011 and then stabilizing at that level the following year. From 2008 to 
2011, number of bond deals went up with remarkably 571%, reaching a period of 53 deals 
that year. Even though total volumes decreased from 2010-2012, the proportional use of 
bond as means of ship financing in our sample actually peaked in 2012 at 45.8 %.  
Results 
Considering the information presented in the previous paragraph, it seems quite likely that at 
least two of our earlier presented hypotheses are confirmed. Namely that the proportion of 
bonds and the number of bond issues has increased substantially in the aftermath of the 
recent financial crisis. We will, however, check these hypotheses statistically, in addition to 
the others we have put forward. 
Looking at the most obvious results first, our analysis has proven that there has indeed been 
a substantial increase both in the proportion of bond financing, as well as the number of 
bonds issued post the financial crisis. The average of bond proportion has experienced a 
growth of around 16pp from the pre to post period, whereas the average number of deals per 
year has increased with just less than seven issues per year. We furthermore see that both 
results have very low p-values, making them highly significant (with a 99% confidence 
level).    
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Pre Post
Mean deal size* 234.421 279.402
Observations 84 175
T-value -0.972
Critical T-value 1.651
P-value 0.166
Mean number of deals 10.75 17.50
Observations 86 175
T-value -3.603
Critical Value -1.658
P-value 2.29E-04
p̂ (proportion) 0.098 0.261
Total observed deals 660 641
Z-value -7.741
Critical Z-value -1.645
P-value 4.94E-15
*Deals with 0 value are  not included
Bonds (CB+Conv)
Amount per deal t-test
Number of deals t-test
Proportion z-test
 
Table 7: Bond Results 
Looking further into the data provided for each individual year, we see that both the number 
of issues and bond proportion of financing have actually experienced an almost continuous 
growth between 2005 and 2012. From having 19 issues and representing only 5.1% of 
financing in 2005, the asset class has gradually grown in importance the next 8 years, having 
52 issues and representing 45.3% in 2012. This is a quite remarkable growth, and one can 
clearly say that the total financing picture has drastically changed. 
Considering the changing financial picture, it is, however, also important to consider the 
scale difference of total financing of the pre and post period. Looking at the data, bond 
volumes reached its peak in 2010, at $18.2 billion, while bank loan volumes reached its peak 
in 2005 at an annual total of $49 billion. The peak of the bank loans is hence more than twice 
the size of the equivalent bond peak. Looking at the results, we see that bonds represented 
just over 45.3% of total ship financing in 2012. This is, however, of at total of $24.5 billion, 
which is significantly lower than the total financing peak of $93 billion from 2007. Such 
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findings further confirm our earlier conclusion, namely that the total availability/need for 
funding has decreased significantly post the crisis. Putting it in terms of macroeconomics, 
the equilibrium point for supply and demand of shipping financing has moved down to a 
lower intersection point.  
Looking further into bond instrumental variables, our test found no substantial change in the 
bonds deal size. Considering the p-value, we see that the result is not even significant within 
a 90% confidence level, leading us to reject it. Looking at Figure 16, we, however, notice 
that the graph behaves much alike that of bank loans (total volume peeking in 2010, while 
number of deals peaking in 2011). One can hence draw the same conclusion as that of bank 
loans, namely that bond deal size did in fact increase quite steeply (133%) from 2009 to 
2010. It has, however, dropped since then, but down to a level just above that of 2005-06. 
Given that the new level is still below that of 2007-08, the average of the two periods will be 
quite similar. There have hence been no significant change in bond sizes comparing the pre 
and post period, and our initial hypothesis was rejected. Nevertheless, if one had examined 
the periods of 2009-10 and 2010-12, we would first have seen a significant growth in deal 
sizes, before the amount fell steeply down again to pre boom levels. 
Further analyzing the bonds' transactions tenor and interest rate, our statistical test found 
significant changes in both interest rates and tenors post 01.09.2013. These results can be 
found in Table 8. The interest rate increased from an average of 4.9 to 6 %, whereas bonds’ 
tenor dropped from an average of just over 8 years to 4.9 years. These results confirm our 
hypotheses that the lenders requiring higher risk premiums in times of greater uncertainty, 
and are less willing to issue bonds of long duration in times were solvency might be 
questioned. Looking at the p-value of the results, we see that the later result is highly 
significant (with a 99% confidence level), whereas the increase in risk premium is only valid 
at a 95% confidence level, making it only significant.  
Considering these results, it is, however, important to take into consideration that we have 
not had access to rating information on the various companies examined. We have hence not 
considered how rating changes have affected the interest rate in the sample period.  
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Pre Post Pre Post
Mean maturity in years 8.110 4.912 Mean 4.932 6.028
Observations 45 200 Observations 37 187
T-value 3.604 T-value -2.030
Critical T-value 1.677 Critical T-value -1.674
P-value 3.66E-04 P-value 0.024
Bonds Tenor Bonds Interest Rate
t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
 
Table 8: Tenor and Interest Rate 
 It is furthermore interesting to observe that while the bottom fell out of all the publicly trade 
market (Bonds, IPOs and FOs) in 2008, bank loan volumes experienced a boost in volumes 
the same year. This is interesting, as regardless of the sharp decline in the public trade 
market, bank still issued loans, making it a typically example of banks' liberal lending during 
booms. We will go in more detail of why the bottom fell out of the publicly traded market in 
our “Macroeconomic event” section. 
Explanatory variables 
In this section, we wish to briefly touch upon the bond's role as an alternative source of 
capital in order to build up the reader's understanding of the key fundamentals behind the 
movements in the bond market, before moving on to the macroeconomic events section.  
Bonds’ role as a financial instrument 
Bonds are often considered as an alternative source of financing, typically used when 
investors are unable to attain desired amount of capital from bank loans. This can either be 
the case of a tightening capital market in a down cycle, the beginning of an upswing in the 
market or the firm is in an economic position/rating, which limits its possibility of obtaining 
bank loans at a sustainable yield. The reason for its recognition as an alternative source of 
capital is two-folded. For one, bond financing is an expensive type of financing, where the 
lenders requires yield above what banks charge in order to be properly compensated for their 
comparatively larger degree of bankruptcy risk. Bondholders are in the case of bankruptcy, 
as described in our theory section, much less likely to get their claims fulfilled, than a bank 
in the similar situation. This disadvantage leads the bondholders to charge a higher interest 
rate. Secondly, governments and banks do not always have the same interest, causing the 
effect of government incentives to not always turn out as planned. In poor economic times, 
the government will push down the interest rate in order to encourage people to spend 
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money. A decline in the central bank interest rate will encourage lending, given the cheaper 
loan arrangements, while on the other hand discourage bank saving, given the lower rate of 
return. The government and the banks do, however, not always want the same thing. 
Typically when the government reduces the interest rate, the banks’ profit margin decreases 
depending on how the decline affects the interbank rate. Furthermore, governments typically 
reduce interest rates in times where lender's solvency may become an issue. Banks would 
then usually be more reluctant to overextend lending. Such conflicting issues hence cause 
governmental measures to not always have the attended effect. For such reasons, bonds then 
become an alternative type of financing in times of low interest rates. As bond’s interest rate 
is based upon the 3-month interbank rate of the issuing country, bonds only charge a yield 
spread (risk premium) above this lending rate. This makes bond a fairly cheap way of 
financing in times when the banks contract. As the market recovers, however, interest rates 
again rise, as the government wishes to control the inflation pressure building up. This 
causes bonds to become an increasingly more expensive way of financing as the economy 
picks up speed. 
Macroeconomic events  
We have decided to include a separate section describing the key macroeconomic events for 
bonds. The reasoning for including such as section is that even though we have already 
described the main events that have occurred, these events effect on bank loans and equity 
are, to some extent, clearer than that of bonds. We also find that there are in addition to the 
general events, other happenings affecting the development in bonds. An inclusion of these, 
in the earlier section, could have made it less intuitive for the reader, leading us to discuss 
these separately. In order to minimize redundancy, we have also tried to only briefly touch 
upon the key events necessary to explain the activity in the bond market. 
The shipping market experienced one of the century’s largest booms in freight rates between 
2003/4 and 2008. For many shipowners, the identification of a boom entails a hunt for 
capital in order to make investments early on in the cycle. As there is a lag between ordering 
and receiving ships, being able to recognize a boom early is of immense importance in this 
industry. Bank loans are, as mentioned, historically the first source of capital the shipowners 
seek, and with the freight rates picking up speed in 2003/04, bank loans issuance 
skyrocketed by 2005. Not all shipowners were, however, able to attain desired level of 
capital through bank loans, for various reasons, and as the growth continued, shipowners 
gradually started to exhaust their available bank loan capital, leading to a steady increase of 
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alternative financing such as bonds, IPOs and FOs. This can explain the gradual growth in 
bond issuance observed. However, as a boom grows, banks typically become more lenient 
on the loan requirements (Lee, Haque 2011). This leads the availability of bank loans to 
increase, explaining the relative lower comparative growth of bonds to bank loans up until 
freight rates peaked. Bank loans will hence stand for most financing during booms, but firms 
will also make use alternative sources of capital, if they are unable to attain the desired 
amount of capital from banks. It is likely that this explains parts of the gradual rise of bonds 
issuances up until 2007.  
Interestingly, all publicly traded securities considered in this sample (Bonds, IPOs and FOs) 
experienced a steep decline in issuances in 2008. Such a decline must hence have started 
prior to the crash of the markets, with Lehman Brothers going bankrupt in mid-September 
that year. Such a drop in volumes can be explained with rising uncertainties in the market, 
with the American housing bubble starting to burst in 2006/2007. According to Duca, 
Muellbauer and Murphy (2010), the bubble gripped the financial markets already from 
August 2007. This uncertainty caused a bearish sentiment, which also can be observed from 
the gradual decline of the stock market from the end of 2007 (Dow Jones Index, 2013). 
When the banks liquidity dried up in the end of 2008, many turned to bonds as means of 
financing. After the Lehman Brothers crash, investors risk aversion also increased 
significantly (Von Hagen, Schuknecht, Wolswijk, 2011), leading the term spread to rise 
proportionally with the increase in demand. With the optimism in the world economy again 
emerging by the middle of 2009, demand for bonds further rose the next year. Other 
contributing factors to the boom in shipping bonds were, among other things, the investment 
banks receiving large fees for completing high-yield bond deals, and the lenders being 
tempted by the high coupons that the shipping high-yield bonds offered (Grammenos, 
Papapostolou, 2012). 
 In the second half of 2010, the world economy and with it the shipping market went again 
into a period of negative market sentiment. This downturn in global trade led investments to 
decrease and hence caused the demand of financing to fall as well. Bad times also led many 
investors to invest in sovereign instead of corporate bonds, as many of these had historically 
been seen upon as safe havens. This downturn in the global corporate bond market lasted 
until early 2011, when the solvency of Greece, and later the rest of the PIGS countries were 
put to question. With the solvency of these previously safe havens put to question, investors’ 
demand for corporate bonds again increased (Deutsche Bank 2013). With no longer any risk-
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free investments, and the sovereign funds now still considered reasonably safe, offering even 
lower returns, investors saw corporate bonds as an increasingly attractive investment in 
search of yield. Such trend can be found by looking at the proportional financing 
development of our data. We believe the correlation between the global economy and ship 
financing is better displayed by looking at the proportional financing than that of total 
volumes after 2009. Our reasoning for such a conclusion is that as the financing need 
together with bond deal sizes decreased from 2010-2012, the total bond volume development 
(declining) does hence not reflect the increase in number of bond issuances caused by the 
shift away from sovereign bonds.  
12.4.3 Country of issuance 
Given the changing financing picture in today’s market we have put forward several 
hypotheses of shifts we expect to see within the worldwide ship financing, these hypotheses 
being partially based on theory and partly based on comments by industry professionals.  
Considering the historically most important source of ship financing first, our statistical test 
of bank loans found indeed a significant change in all regions covered. The results can be 
found in Tables: 9-13. Asia increased its proportion of the number of worldwide bank loans 
issuances with 20pp, from 19% to 39%, whereas Scandinavia experienced an increase of just 
under 8pp, from 6.7 to 14.6 %. On the declining side, North America, Europe and Middle 
East all had a substantial drops, with both Europe and the Middle East falling approximately 
8pp, from 43 to 35% and 11 to 2.8% respectively. North America experienced a decline of 
almost 12pp, from 18.3 to 6.4%. This test hence confirmed all hypotheses put forward for 
bank loans. All results also show very low p-values, indicating that they are highly 
significant (with a 99% confidence level).  
Examining the source of debt with most growth in this period first, our statistical test only 
found a significant change in the proportions of bonds activity in Scandinavia, coming from 
a significant increase in the issuance of bonds. The results can be found in Tables 9-13. Only 
two of our hypotheses were hence confirmed. (Middle East did not have a significant amount 
of bond deals and was hence not tested.) The p-values were non-significant for all, except for 
Scandinavia, showing a significant change within a 95% confidence level.  
Examining these results more in detail, we see that Scandinavia in the post period 
contributes to almost 28.5% of the total number of world shipping bond issuance, an 
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increase from 19.5% in the pre period. Except from that, we can observe that both Asia and 
Europe strengthen their proportions of number of deals made as predicted, while the North 
American markets issued a proportionally lower number of deals in the post period. None of 
these changes were, however, substantial, causing two of our hypotheses not to be fulfilled.  
Considering Julian Macqueen’s article in Lloyd’s List, where he, in the first half of 2010, 
stated that there were only two fixed-income markets that shipping firms should consider if 
deciding to issue bonds, the United States and Norway (Lloyd's List, 2010). We find that 
there have indeed been some changes in the market picture since this article was written. As 
things stand now, Scandinavia has accounted for the greatest activity of shipping bonds in 
the post period, closely followed by Asia, whereas North America, on the other hand, has 
actually issued fewest shipping bond (18%) since 01.09.2008.  
It is, however, important to point out that we have in our tests considered the activity of the 
various financial institutions, not the total debt volumes issued. We are hence comparing 
apples and pears, and our results may very well separate from those found if considering 
total bond volumes. This would be the case if the amount raised per deal differs between the 
regions.  
Lastly, looking at the combined shifts of the two debt sources discussed above, our test 
found again significant results for all the regions tested. The results can be found in Table 
14. Asia strengthened its position considerably from a 20% proportion of number of 
shipping debt issuances in the pre period to at total of 35.5% in the post period. Scandinavia 
followed with a 10pp increase, in the proportion of total number of issuance, from 9 to 19%. 
While Europe and North America experienced a drop of respectively 8 and 10pp, leaving the 
two with 32% and 10% respectively of total number of shipping debt issuance. All results 
gave a very low p-value, making all results highly significant (with a 99% confidence level). 
Going back to our hypotheses, we see that all proposed hypotheses for total debt level were 
confirmed. 
 Looking at all countries of issuance results combined, we see that most of our initial 
predictions were confirmed. There have indeed been shifts in the capital market activity 
away from North America, Europe and Middle East towards Asia and Scandinavia. These 
effects are, however, not as strong for bonds as for bank loans. This was, to some extent, 
predictable, as the most important finding for bonds was the recent shift towards the 
Scandinavia fixed-income market.  
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Asia  
Bonds Bank Loans
Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.241 0.273 p̂ (proportion) 0.193 0.397
Total observations 112 355 Total observations 683 926
Critical Z-value -1.645 Critical Z-value -1.645
Z-value -0.672 Z-value -8.745
P-value 0.251 P-value 1.111E-18
ASIA ASIA
 
Table 9: Asia: Country of Issuance 
Scandinavia 
Bonds Bank Loans
Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.196 0.285 p̂ (proportion) 0.067 0.147
Total observations 112 355 Total observations 683 926
Critical Z-value -1.645 Critical Z-value -1.645
Z-value -1.845 Z-value -4.978
P-value 3.25E-02 P-value 3.22013E-07
SCANDINAVIA SCANDINAVIA
 
Table 10: Scandinavia: Country of Issuance 
North America 
Bonds Bank Loans
Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.232 0.180 p̂ (proportion) 0.183 0.065
Total observations 112 355 Total observations 683 926
Critical Z-value -1.645 Critical Z-value 1.645
Z-value 1.213 Z-value 7.348
P-value 0.113 P-value 1.01E-13
NORTH AMERICANORTH AMERICA
 
Table 11: North America Country of Issuance 
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Europe 
 
Bonds Bank Loans
Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.205 0.228 p̂ (proportion) 0.435 0.350
Total observations 112 355 Total observations 683 926
Critical Z-value -1.645 Critical Z-value 1.645
Z-value -0.506 Z-value 3.460
P-value 0.306 P-value 2.70E-04
EUROPEEUROPE
 
Table 12: Europe: Country of Issuance 
Middle East 
Bank Loans
Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.117 0.028
Total observations 683 926
Critical value 1.645
Z-value 7.117
P-value 5.508E-13
MIDDLE EAST
 
Table 13: Middle-East: Country of Issuance 
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Combined: 
Pooled (Bank loans + CB)
Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.200 0.365 p̂ (proportion) 0.086 0.191
Total observations 795 1281 Total observations 795 1281
Critical Z-value -1.645 Critical Z-value -1.645
Z-value -7.942 Z-value -6.544
P-value 9.959E-16 P-value 2.996E-11
Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.204 0.100 p̂ (proportion) 0.403 0.322
Total observations 795 1281 Total observations 795 1281
Critical Z-value 1.645 Critical Z-value 1.645
Z-value 6.635 Z-value 3.750
P-value 1.622E-11 P-value 8.845E-05
ASIA SCANDINAVIA
NORTH AMERICA EUROPE
 
Table 14: Combined: Country of Issuance 
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13. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to determine the key changes in ship financing caused by 
the recent financial crisis. After the shipping market experienced years of continuous 
upswing fuelled by the Chinese economy in the start of the millennium, the world economy 
and with it the shipping industry went into a deep trough, with the financial turmoil reaching 
its peak in mid-September 2008.  As the financial market collapsed, so did the access to 
capital. In the following years, shipowners have experienced a different funding 
environment. Through examining our tailored database, we found that there indeed been a 
significant change in financing in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  Our statistical 
evidence show that both equity and bank loans have contributed with a significantly smaller 
proportion of ship financing in this post period. 
The decrease in lending volumes can, considering the whole post period, mainly be 
attributed to the decrease in number of deals, as deal sizes have not changed significantly 
between 2008 and 2012. However, if one examines the two last years separately, one 
observes a severe drop in loan deal sizes. A drop coming as a result of a combination of 
factors, among other things; decreasing vessel values and risk mitigation efforts from the 
banks side. One can hence conclude that the reason for the drop in volume is two folded, 
with the second factor only contributing in the second part of the period. Examining the 
underlying factors for the decrease in lending, we see that the pending Basel III regulations; 
causing many banks to drop risky portfolios like shipping, the drop in vessel values; leading 
to lower financing need and the stricter lending policies, are the key reasons for the reduction 
in lending liquidity. 
The decrease in equity seems to a large degree to be caused by the severe drop in IPOs. 
Looking at the results, the key findings are a significant decrease in both the IPO and Private 
Placement (PP) activity, coupled with a severe drop in IPO deal size. On the contrary, 
average private placement deal size nearly doubled in the post period. A likely reason for 
this is the surge of private equity deals in 2010/11. However, given the limited number of 
deals, the total effect of this surge was not of significance. It is, however, hard to tell whether 
all private placement transactions were caught by the information gatherers, given the 
private nature of these deals. In addition to private placements, FO activity did actually 
increase in the beginning of the post period, before slowly decreasing. One can hence say it 
 104 
remained fairly stable, as investors have turned to it, in some instances, as an alternative 
source of funding. The total effects of PP and FOs were, however, not enough to alter the 
general negative trend of equity issuance, as both IPO activity and deal size fell drastically 
from a high in 2007. The key reasons for such a decline seems again to be a drop in market 
values of the shipping firms, leading to lower deal sizes and a general aversion from turning 
to the equity market in times when the management knows that the firm value is not 
reflected in what they can raise in the public market. 
With a drop in bank loans and equity issuance, we find that the funding gap left by these 
have to a large degree been filled by bond issuances; with our test finding a significant 
increase in number of bond deals. However, this gap may be smaller than what many think, 
as the substantial drop in market value significantly reduces the funding needed. The drop in 
financing need has, however, likely not been as steep as that of market values, as many of 
the deals needing financing in the post period, have already been ordered in the pre period at 
considerable contract fees.  
Regardless of the significant decrease in lending volumes, our results show that bank loans 
still represent the largest portion of vessel financing. With bank loans and equity issuance 
contracting, shipowners have been left with severely limited options, leading them to turn to 
bonds and, to some extent, private equity and FOs, as alternative capital sources. It is, 
however, only a minority of shipping firms that are involved in the bond market (Falck, 
2013), and one should hence not overemphasize this shift. What we rather see as an 
explanatory factor for the increasing funding share of alternative capital, is a significant drop 
in overall shipping funding. Bond volumes have really not increased that much, but this 
source of capital has rather experienced an increase in proportion as a result of the other 
asset classes declining volumes. In addition to our findings, we would also like to mention as 
a side note, that we in reality expected private equity to stand for a larger degree of ship 
financing than what we have found in our analysis. We believe, given the private nature of 
these deals, that it is likely that not all transactions of this kind are included in our sample.  
Furthermore, considering how the different debt variables have been affected by the 
financial crisis, our test found that bonds have experienced an increase in interest rates and a 
drop in tenor. Such behavior seems natural given the large degree of uncertainty in the 
market, causing investor to demand larger returns, and shorter commitments. As a risk 
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mitigation tool, we also observe that bank consortium sizes have increased in the post period, 
as firms wish to diversify their lending portfolio and reduce exposure per deal. 
Examining the global movement of capital, we find empirical evidence that as bonds 
increase in importance and the proportional funding of bank loans deteriorate, the origin of 
capital shifts from North America, Europe and the Middle East, to Scandinavia and Asia. It 
is, however, questionable whether the change of origin can be fully credited to the overall 
shift in funding, or whether there are other factors behind the shift.  
Our statistical test found that Asia increased its funding proportion both in terms of bank 
loans and bonds, although bank loans were the only statistical significant figure. Considering 
the overall growth in the Asian economy over the period, we see that such a growth have led 
banks to be in better financial shape, caused Asia to take an increasingly larger part in the 
shipping industry and made Chinese business flourish, causing cash reserves to mount up 
and hence investors to search for yield. Such growth seems therefore to be the most 
significant factor behind the increased funding from this region, attributing little importance 
to the shift from bank loans to bonds. 
Scandinavia has, however, had a tremendous increase in bonds, far larger than its increase in 
bank lending. One can hence assume that at least a larger part of its change can be credited 
to the shift of funding. Furthermore, with the financial crisis  leaving Scandinavia fairly 
untouched, it is likely that the solid financial position these institutions find themselves in; in 
combination with the tightening global lending market, have led the Scandinavia lending 
volumes to rise. One can hence give this shift in funding a great explanatory degree. 
 Our test found that North America experienced a drop in both bond and lending issuances, 
with only the later being significant. Such declines can to a large degree be explained by the 
worsening financial situation for banks and the investors loosing trust in the market. The 
later leading substantial amounts of capital to be extracted from the market (Moody's, 2013) 
and investors requiring higher return as they penalize structural imbalance stronger in the 
post period (Von Hagen, Schuknecht, Wolswijk, 2011). Interpreting this, we find that the 
shift in funding can to a large degree explain the decline in bank loans, but given the strong 
US bond market in the pre period, one would perhaps expect a movement from loans to 
bonds for shipping companies. However, given the limitations of the US corporate bond 
market, with little shipping knowledge and firms needing to be of a significant size to be 
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recognized (Falck, 2013), such factors may lead the US bond market only to be suitable for a 
limited number of shipping firms. When there, in addition, have been large amounts of 
capital held out of the market, resulting in a severe decline in demand, these forces combined 
could lead to a decline in the North American shipping corporate bond market.  
Lastly, our test found that Europe experienced a significant drop in lending and a small shift 
towards bond issuance in the post period, with the later being insignificant. Such a trend 
hence follows the overall trend of world ship financing and leaves the shift with a great 
explanatory degree. It should, however, be noted that while the shift away from bank loans 
seems to have come as a direct effect of the financial crisis, the growth in the corporate 
bonds did, however, not recover before after the European sovereign debt crisis. This led 
investors away from sovereign debt, making corporate bonds increasingly appealing in the 
search of yield (Deutsche Bank, 2013). This event should hence be put some emphasis on, as 
it is a significant explanatory factor for the increase in European corporate bond issuance 
activity. 
Summarizing up, we see that the shift has had a different degree of effect on the various 
regions, with the Scandinavian capital market being affected the most, while Asia having 
other factors driving its primary growth. There, furthermore, seems to be a direct link 
between both the European and North American decline in shipping lending and the shift of 
capital, while the movement of corporate bonds in these two regions seems to be led by other 
factors. 
Analyzing the change in financing according to traditional capital structure theory, we firstly 
conclude that the trade-off theory is not well suited for the shipping industry and secondly 
that the financial behavior of shipowners today is more complex than assumed by the 
pecking order theory. We see that the recent shift of financing could be explained by the 
market timing theory, findings supported by Grammenos, and Papapostolou (2012). 
However, crediting the overall funding movement to this theory could be to exaggerate its 
effect. The lack of financing options during the tight capital markets seems to be an equally 
valid explanation, hence partially rejecting this theory. One could, however, claim that the 
market timing theory has a significantly higher explanatory degree in the pre period, where 
financing options were numerous and the majority of shipowners chose the cheapest source 
of financing, hence supporting the theory. 
 107 
Given the volatile nature of the shipping industry and its impact on the financing sources 
available to shipowners, we do not believe that the shift we have seen in our analysis is of a 
permanent nature. Bank loans will always play an instrumental role in shipping financing. 
They provide the cheapest source of capital, and even though many banks have pulled out of 
the industry at present time, they will be tempted to return as the market recovers. This can, 
however, take some time. Furthermore, bonds are and always will be an alternative source of 
financing. This given its nature of being expensive, something that is further enhanced as the 
economy recovers. We do, nevertheless, believe that bonds will play a greater role in ship 
financing in the future. Bonds do, however, not fit for all shipping operators, as the industry 
operators still are to a large degree privatized, fragmented and on average small (Falck, 
2013). Looking to the future, we do, however, expect bonds to take some of banks' funding 
share; as such inclusion is beneficial for all parts of the industry (banks, shipowner, 
underwriters and lenders). 
 
14. Appendix 
Appendix 1: Amount per deal t-test 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean 377.405 372.551 Mean 234.42 279.40 Mean 465.8019565 329.3589796
Variance 354663.309 806911.264 Variance 48736.50 273491.45 Variance 669174.461 724728.8214
Standard deviation 595.536 898.282 Standard deviation 220.76 522.96 Standard deviation 818.0308436 851.3100619
Observations 341 297 Observations 84.00 175.00 Observations 184 49
Degrees of Freedom 502 Degrees of Freedom 254 Degrees of Freedom 73
t Stat 0.0792 t Stat -0.9717 t Stat 1.005128275
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.4685 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.1661 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.159077618
t Critical one-tail 1.6479 t Critical one-tail 1.6509 t Critical one-tail 1.665996224
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.9369 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.3321 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.318155235
t Critical two-tail 1.9647 t Critical two-tail 1.9693 t Critical two-tail 1.992997097
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean 299.010 148.048 Mean 195.5154659 161.8782314 Mean 111.9854762 190.3414286
Variance 143346.710 11343.261 Variance 91050.83159 61766.50883 Variance 9651.959981 49149.06687
Standard deviation 378.612 106.505 Standard deviation 301.7463034 248.5286881 Standard deviation 98.24438906 221.6958883
Observations 103 32 Observations 90 116 Observations 42 21
Degrees of Freedom 132 Degrees of Freedom 171 Degrees of Freedom 24
T-value 3.612596223 t Stat 0.856004662 t Stat -1.545557358
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000214828 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.196596543 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.067648477
t Critical one-tail 1.65647927 t Critical one-tail 1.653813324 t Critical one-tail 1.710882067
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000429655 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.393193087 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.135296954
t Critical two-tail 1.978098814 t Critical two-tail 1.973933915 t Critical two-tail 2.063898547
Deals with 0 value are  not included
Deals with 0 alue are not included
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Deals with 0 value are  not included
Bonds (CE+Conv) M&A
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
FO
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Deals with 0 value are  not included
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
PPIPO
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Deals with 0 value are  not included
Bank Loans
Deals with 0 value are  not included
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
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Appendix 2: Number of deals t-test 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean number of deals 85.75 62.4 Mean number of deals 10.75 17.5 Mean number of deals 61.75 16.2
Variance 562.9166667 1387.3 Variance 126.7857143 356.0555556 Variance 343.5833333 95.2
Standard Deviation 23.72586493 37.24647634 Standard Deviation 11.25991626 18.86943443 Standard Deviation 18.53600101 9.757048734
Observations 343 312 Observations 86 175 Observations 247 81
STD(Pre-Post) 2.467312469 STD(Pre-Post) 1.873193975 STD(Pre-Post) 1.60197824
Degrees of freedom 318.7900827 Degrees of freedom 120.8397287 Degrees of freedom 126.1349962
T-value 9.463738497 T-value -3.603470912 T-value 28.43359469
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05
Critical  T-value 1.649659429 Critical  T-value -1.6576509 Critical  T-value 1.657036982
P-value 3.45744E-19 P-value 0.0002291 P-value 5.735E-57
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean number of deals 31.25 9 Mean number of deals 23 23.8 Mean number of deals 11 4.4
Variance 176.9166667 77.5 Variance 74 212.7 Variance 63.33333333 7.8
Standard Deviation 13.30100247 8.803408431 Standard Deviation 8.602325267 14.58423807 Standard Deviation 7.958224258 2.792848009
Observations 125 45 Observations 92 119 Observations 44 22
0
STD(Pre-Post) 1.77131464 STD(Pre-Post) 1.60988906 STD(Pre-Post) 1.339380228
Degrees of freedom 62.06173846 Degrees of freedom 108.0505023 Degrees of freedom 35.62415034
T-value 12.56129176 T-value -0.496928652 T-value 4.927652256
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05
Critical  T-value 1.669804163 Critical  T-value 1.659085144 Critical  T-value 1.68957244
P-value 5.42549E-19 P-value 0.310124714 P-value 9.9788E-06
Bonds (CB+Conv)
FO PPIPO
M&ABank Loans
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Appendix 3: Proportion z-test 
Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion 0.638735214 0.591522487 p̂ (proportion 0.097731449 0.261394962
Total observed deals 660 641 Total observed deals 660 641
p 0.616005486 p 0.176524338
q=(1-p) 0.383994514 q=(1-p) 0.823475662
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05
Critical Z-value 1.644853627 Critical Z-value -1.644853627
Z-value 1.750518141 Z-value -7.740812061
P-value 0.040014473 P-value 4.93919E-15
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion 0.152855694 0.025326965 p̂ (proportion 0.087333912 0.10038668 p̂ (proportion 0.023343731 0.021368905
Total observed deals 660 641 Total observed deals 660 641 Total observed deals 660 641
p 0.091459254 p 0.093617935 p 0.022392986
q=(1-p) 0.908540746 q=(1-p) 0.906382065 q=(1-p) 0.977607014
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05
Critical Z-value 1.644853627 Critical Z-value -1.644853627 Critical Z-value -1.644853627
Z-value 7.977821827 Z-value -0.808034296 Z-value 0.240687234
P-value 0.0000 P-value 0.20953542 P-value 0.595101233
IPO FO PP
Bank Loans Bonds (CB+Conv)
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Appendix 4: Debt Instruments Variables 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Mean maturity in years 8.109954338 4.912383562 Mean 4.93227027 6.028048128 Mean 2.078549849 3.084459459
Variance 33.52652471 8.411576664 Variance 8.803779092 10.01408608 Variance 2.242296073 8.355554283
Standard deviation 5.790209384 2.900271826 Standard deviation 2.967116292 3.164504081 Standard deviation 1.497429822 2.890597565
Observations 45 200 Observations 37 187 Observations 331 296
Degrees of Freedom 49 Degrees of Freedom 54 Degrees of Freedom 431
T-value 3.604188375 T-value -2.029596794 T-value -5.376618535
Critical T-value 1.676550893 Critical T-value -1.673564907 Critical T-value 1.648396712
P-value 0.000365652 P-value 0.023668798 P-value 6.23233E-08
Bonds Tenor
t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Size of Consortium Interest Rate
t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances t-test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
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Appendix 5: Country of Issuance Bank Loans 
Banks
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.193265007 0.397408207 p̂ (proportion) 0.434846266 0.349892009 p̂ (proportion) 0.183016105 0.064794816
Total observations 683 926 Total observations 683 926 Total observations 683 926
p 0.31075202 p 0.385954009 p 0.114978247
q =(1-p) 0.68924798 q =(1-p) 0.614045991 q =(1-p) 0.885021753
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05
Critical Z-value -1.644853627 Critical Z-value 1.644853627 Critical Z-value 1.644853627
Z-value -8.745366412 Z-value 3.45982988 Z-value 7.347654024
P-value 1.11147E-18 P-value 0.000270258 P-value 1.00808E-13
ASIA EUROPE NORTH AMERICA
 
Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.067349927 0.146868251 p̂ (proportion) 0.117130307 0.028077754
Total observations 683 926 Total observations 683 926
p 0.113113735 p 0.065879428
q =(1-p) 0.886886265 q =(1-p) 0.934120572
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05
Critical Z-value -1.644853627 critical value 1.644853627
Z-value -4.977524464 z 7.117177911
P-value 3.22013E-07 p-value 5.50782E-13
MIDDLE EASTSCANDINAVIA
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Appendix 6: Country of Issuance Bonds 
Bonds
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.241071429 0.273239437 p̂ (proportion) 0.205357143 0.228169014 p̂ (proportion) 0.232142857 0.18028169
Total observations 112 355 Total observations 112 355 Total observations 112 355
p 0.265524625 p 0.222698073 p 0.192719486
q =(1-p) 0.734475375 q =(1-p) 0.777301927 q =(1-p) 0.807280514
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05
Critical Z-value -1.644853627 Critical Z-value -1.644853627 Critical Z-value -1.644853627
Z-value -0.672121665 Z-value -0.505909177 Z-value 1.213198832
P-value 0.250753123 P-value 0.306460205 P-value 0.112526905
ASIA EUROPE NORTH AMERICA
 
 
Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.196428571 0.284507
Total observations 112 355
p 0.263383298
q =(1-p) 0.736616702
Alpha 0.05
Critical Z-value -1.644853627
Z-value -1.845098761
P-value 0.032511587
SCANDINAVIA
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Appendix 7: Country of Issuance Combined 
Pooled (Bank loans + CB)
ASIA EUROPE NORTH AMERICA
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.2 0.364558938 p̂ (proportion) 0.402515723 0.321623731 p̂ (proportion) 0.203773585 0.099921936
Total observations 795 1281 Total observations 795 1281 Total observations 795 1281
p 0.301541426 p 0.352601156 p 0.139691715
q =(1-p) 0.698458574 q =(1-p) 0.647398844 q =(1-p) 0.860308285
Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05 Alpha 0.05
Critical Z-value -1.644853627 Critical Z-value 1.644853627 Critical Z-value 1.644853627
Z-value -7.941857913 Z-value 3.749921342 Z-value 6.635069466
P-value 9.95875E-16 P-value 8.8445E-05 P-value 1.62175E-11  
 
SCANDINAVIA
Pre Post
p̂ (proportion) 0.085534591 0.191257
Total observations 795 1281
p 0.150770713
q =(1-p) 0.849229287
Alpha 0.05
Critical Z-value -1.644853627
Z-value -6.543947894
P-value 2.99578E-11
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Appendix 8: Mann Whitney-U, SPSS output 
 
Bank Loans 
Ranks 
 GroupBL N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Bank Loans 
1.00 341 342.32 116731.50 
2.00 297 293.30 87109.50 
Total 638   
 
 
Bonds (CB+Conv) 
 
Ranks 
 GroupBonds N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Bonds 
1.00 84 130.82 10989.00 
2.00 175 129.61 22681.00 
Total 259   
 
 
Test Statistics 
 Bank Loans 
Mann-Whitney U 42856.500 
Wilcoxon W 87109.500 
Z -3.351 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
a. Grouping Variable: GroupBL 
Test Statistics 
 Bonds 
Mann-Whitney U 7281.000 
Wilcoxon W 22681.000 
Z -.122 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .903 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .903 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .452 
Point Probability .000 
a. Grouping Variable: GroupBonds 
Test Statistics 
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IPO 
Ranks 
 GroupIPO N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
IPO 
1.00 103 72.20 7437.00 
2.00 32 54.47 1743.00 
Total 135   
 
Follow-Ons 
 
Ranks 
 GroupFO N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
FO 
1.00 90 110.55 9949.50 
2.00 116 98.03 11371.50 
Total 206   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IPO 
Mann-Whitney U 1215.000 
Wilcoxon W 1743.000 
Z -2.241 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .025 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .025 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .012 
Point Probability .000 
a. Grouping Variable: GroupIPO 
Test Statistics 
 FO 
Mann-Whitney U 4585.500 
Wilcoxon W 11371.500 
Z -1.495 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .135 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .135 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .068 
Point Probability .000 
a. Grouping Variable: GroupFO 
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Private Placement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M&A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranks 
 GroupPP N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
PP 
1.00 42 30.95 1300.00 
2.00 21 34.10 716.00 
Total 63   
Test Statistics 
 PP 
Mann-Whitney U 397.000 
Wilcoxon W 1300.000 
Z -.642 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .521 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .526 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .263 
Point Probability .002 
a. Grouping Variable: GroupPP 
Ranks 
 GroupMA N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
MA 
1.00 184 121.73 22397.50 
2.00 49 99.26 4863.50 
Total 233   
Test Statistics 
 MA 
Mann-Whitney U 3638.500 
Wilcoxon W 4863.500 
Z -2.074 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .038 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) .038 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .019 
Point Probability .000 
a. Grouping Variable: GroupMA 
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Appendix 9:  Normality Test 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Bank Loans .311 638 .000 .397 638 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Bonds .279 259 .000 .419 259 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
IPO .260 135 .000 .610 135 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
FO .265 206 .000 .532 206 .000 
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a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
PP .191 63 .000 .765 63 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
MA .299 233 .000 .489 233 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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